A Brent enforcement appeal has succeeded after an Inspector found that a building described by the council as a new three-bedroom dwellinghouse was, in fact, still only a shell.
Inspector M Bale allowed appeal APP/T5150/C/25/3377160 on 25th September 2026.
The case concerned development on Sidmouth Road, London, where the enforcement notice alleged the unauthorised erection of a three-bedroom single-family dwellinghouse with a ground floor, basement, lower basement, lightwells, raised platforms and railings.
The result did not simply wipe away the notice.
The Inspector first found that Brent’s allegation had not occurred, corrected the notice so that it alleged the erection of a building instead, then considered the planning merits and granted permission for that building.
For anyone dealing with an enforcement notice, it is a neat example of why the wording of the allegation matters.
Planning Geek’s guide to the enforcement appeal grounds explains the difference between ground (b), where the alleged matters did not occur, and ground (a), where planning permission is sought for what has been done.
Ground (b) succeeds in Brent enforcement appeal
At the heart of the Brent enforcement appeal was a basic question: had a dwellinghouse actually been erected?
The appeal site contained a substantially complete external shell over three floors, including two basement levels and one storey above ground.
The Inspector accepted that it looked like a house from outside and that the planning history strongly indicated that a dwellinghouse was ultimately intended. But the interior told a different story.
The decision records bare block walls and exposed concrete floors. There were some bathroom items, but no kitchen or toilet facilities.
In those circumstances, the Inspector found that the building could not yet be occupied as a dwellinghouse. He put the point plainly:
“While the erection of a dwellinghouse may be the ultimate intention, in its current condition, the building cannot be described as one.”
That was fatal to the allegation as Brent had drafted it.
Ground (b) is concerned with whether the matters alleged in the notice actually occurred. Because a dwellinghouse had not yet been constructed, the Inspector concluded that the allegation had not occurred and ground (b) succeeded.
Inspector corrects Brent’s notice to allege a building
Ground (b) success did not automatically mean the notice had to disappear. The Inspector considered whether it could instead be corrected without causing injustice.
One possibility would have been to recast the case as a breach of condition attached to an earlier permission. But the evidence did not establish that the earlier permission had actually been implemented.
The alternative was much simpler: describe what had plainly been erected as a building.
The Inspector therefore corrected the allegation by replacing “three bed single family dwellinghouse” with “building” and removing the separate reference to an “extension to the side”.
The first enforcement requirement was corrected in the same way. The Brent enforcement appeal then proceeded against that corrected allegation.
Permission granted as Brent enforcement appeal moves to ground (a)
Once the notice was corrected, the Brent enforcement appeal moved to the planning merits.
The main issues were the effect on the character and appearance of the area and neighbouring living conditions.
The Inspector found that the low-profile, flat-roofed building respected the surrounding pattern of development despite its different design.
The second basement level was effectively imperceptible from outside and Brent had not demonstrated that it created harmful over-intensification or overdevelopment.
There was one genuine neighbour issue. Use of the raised platform above the projecting basement could allow views into neighbouring windows and gardens.
Rather than refusing permission, the Inspector concluded that this could be dealt with by a condition requiring a privacy scheme before the building was brought into use.
The decision also requires details of drainage, refuse storage, cycle and car parking, highway works and landscaping. A further condition prevents the building being used as a house in multiple occupation.
Even the Framework’s policy on intentional unauthorised development did not alter the outcome.
The Inspector said that, even if the development were treated as intentional, that factor alone was not enough to justify refusal where demonstrable planning harm had not been shown.
Section 75(3): an important point, but not a final answer on use
The Brent enforcement appeal also raised a narrower point under section 75(3) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990.
That provision can mean that planning permission for the erection of a building also carries permission to use it for the purpose for which it was designed where the permission specifies no purpose.
Both parties considered the structure was being designed as a dwellinghouse, and the Inspector took that into account when deciding that the corrected ground (a) appeal could still be determined.
But the decision stops deliberately short of declaring the building lawfully usable as a dwellinghouse.
At paragraph 48 the Inspector expressly left the consequences of section 75(3) for the parties to consider outside the appeal, adding that the decision did not prejudice any future application for a Lawful Development Certificate.
That distinction matters. This enforcement appeal resulted in permission for the building described in the corrected notice. It should not be reported as a conclusive determination that future dwellinghouse use is already lawful.
Partial costs award follows Brent enforcement appeal
A separate costs decision arising from the Brent enforcement appeal adds another sting for the council.
The Inspector did not accept that Brent had acted unreasonably simply by alleging a dwellinghouse. The structure looked like one and the planning history pointed clearly towards that intended outcome.
However, a partial costs award was made in two areas.
First, the notice was unclear in separately referring to an “extension to the side”, leaving the appellant to spend time establishing what Brent meant.
Secondly, the Inspector found that Brent had failed to substantiate its case that the second basement storey caused material planning harm.
The costs decision made the principle explicit:
“The enforcement of planning control should be remedial rather than punitive.”
That did not mean Brent had been wrong to take enforcement action at all; the criticism was narrower.
The award is limited to the wasted expense associated with those two issues rather than the whole appeal.
Why this Brent enforcement appeal matters
For practitioners, the Brent enforcement appeal is a useful reminder that this is not a general rule allowing an unfinished house to escape enforcement simply because it lacks a kitchen or toilet.
The result turned on the allegation Brent actually chose to make, the physical state of the building and the Inspector’s ability to correct the notice without injustice.
The practical lesson is narrower and more useful: an enforcement notice has to allege the breach that has actually occurred.
Where a council alleges the erection of a dwellinghouse, ground (b) can succeed if the thing on the land has not yet reached the point at which it can properly be described as one.
The Brent enforcement appeal therefore did not end with the ground (b) finding. The Inspector corrected the notice, moved on to ground (a) and granted permission for the building itself.
See Planning Geek’s wider guide to enforcement notices and appeals for the statutory process and appeal deadlines.
0 Comments