Barry Field v First Secretary of State and Crawley Borough Council [2004] EWHC 147 (Admin)
Barry Field is an important case on whether an old planning permission had been lawfully commenced. The permission dated from 1967 and authorised demolition of four cottages followed by the erection of two bungalows. The cottages were demolished decades before anybody tried to rely on the permission again.
Mr Justice Sullivan held that the demolition had been capable of commencing the development and quashed the Inspector’s contrary decision.
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- Neutral citation
- [2004] EWHC 147 (Admin)
- Court
- High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, Administrative Court
- Judgment date
- 23rd January 2004
- Judge
- Mr Justice Sullivan
- Case number
- CO/4225/2003
The 1967 permission had no express time limit
Outline planning permission was granted on 18th July 1967 for the demolition of Nos. 1 to 4 Forders Cottages at Fernhill, Crawley and the erection of two bungalows with garages. Reserved matters were approved in September 1967.
Like many permissions granted at that time, the decision notice contained no express condition requiring development to begin within a particular period.
General statutory time limits were introduced by the Town and Country Planning Act 1968. The transitional provisions applied deemed time limits to older permissions which had not already been begun.
The question many years later was therefore whether the 1967 development had in fact been begun before the statutory deadline.
The cottages were demolished between 1969 and 1970
The four cottages were demolished sometime between January 1969 and November 1970. Nothing else was then built.
The Inspector accepted several important facts:
- the demolition was part of the total works necessary to complete the approved bungalow scheme
- it would have been normal building practice to demolish the cottages at the outset
- the work was carried out by a builder
- the demolition was not de minimis
Despite those findings, the Inspector concluded that the permission had not been commenced.
Demolition can itself be development
The Inspector had reasoned that demolition, standing alone, was not development under the law as it existed at the relevant time.
The High Court held that this misunderstood the authorities. Demolition works may amount to development where they fall within building, engineering or other operations. Whether a particular demolition operation does so is a question of fact.
On the facts the Inspector had found, the only reasonable conclusion was that demolishing the cottages was development authorised by the 1967 permission.
Subjective intention was not the test
The Inspector had also considered possible reasons why the former owner might have demolished the cottages. Perhaps they were dangerous, perhaps he wanted to prevent squatters, or perhaps he simply wanted a cleared site.
Sullivan J held that this was effectively an inquiry into the former owner’s subjective motives or intentions.
The court followed the objective approach in Riordan Communications. Where works permitted by the planning permission have genuinely been carried out and are not de minimis, the question is not whether the developer secretly intended to finish the whole scheme at that moment.
That matters particularly with old permissions which may later pass to new owners. Planning rights run with the land, and later owners should be able to rely as far as possible on the planning register and physical evidence rather than trying to reconstruct the thoughts of somebody who carried out works decades earlier.
The old list of specified operations was not the only route to commencement
The Secretary of State argued that the old permission could only have been begun by one of the statutory specified operations. Demolition was not on that list.
The High Court rejected that interpretation of the transitional legislation.
The provisions said that development would be taken to be begun when a specified operation began. They did not say that development could only be begun in that way.
Sullivan J pointed out that some kinds of development, including certain demolition or engineering operations, could otherwise be completely carried out without ever satisfying one of the listed operations. It would be artificial for such development to be lawful under a permission yet legally incapable of being begun for the purposes of its time limit.
This part of Barry Field concerns the special regime for old permissions
Barry Field is particularly valuable when researching permissions granted before the modern time-limit system became established.
The judgment analyses the Town and Country Planning Act 1968, the Town and Country Planning Act 1971 and the continuing transitional provisions applying to permissions granted before 1st April 1969.
It should therefore not be used as though every modern commencement question is governed by precisely the same statutory wording.
For current and historic permissions, the first job is always to identify the legislation and conditions which actually apply to that permission.
The court quashed the Inspector’s refusal of the certificate
The High Court concluded that the Inspector’s decision was legally flawed and quashed it.
The Secretary of State was granted permission to appeal on the wider statutory interpretation point because Sullivan J accepted that the ambit of the old specified-operation provision raised an important issue of principle.
The Planning Geek copy and the open sources checked for this page establish the High Court judgment. This page does not assume a later appellate outcome which is not contained in the material we have verified.
Why Barry Field matters for extant permissions
The case is a good example of why an apparently ancient planning permission can require careful historical analysis rather than a quick look at the date on the decision notice.
Questions can include:
- what statutory time limit applied when the permission was granted
- whether a later Act imposed a deemed condition
- what works were physically carried out and when
- whether those works formed part of the development actually permitted
- whether historic evidence is strong enough for a certificate of lawfulness
Our wider guide explains extant planning permission, material starts and old consents.
Read the full Barry Field judgment
The High Court transcript is held in the Planning Geek case law library. Gold Members can open the protected PDF below.
Barry Field Case Law Page Updated: 9th September 2026