R (Morris Homes Ltd and another) v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government [2026] EWCA Civ 1465
Morris Homes concerns the continuing enforceability of a section 106 carbon-offset contribution after the specialist organisation named in the agreement had ceased trading and was later dissolved. The Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the developer’s appeal and held that the obligation remained workable.
- Neutral citation
- [2026] EWCA Civ 1465
- Court
- Court of Appeal (Civil Division), England and Wales
- Judgment date
- 17th November 2026
- Judge
- Lewison LJ, Zacaroli LJ and Lieven LJ
The development and carbon obligation
Peterborough City Council granted permission in 2011 for 295 homes, a foodstore and associated infrastructure at Glebe Works, Fletton. The site was one of two national Carbon Challenge sites. The original permission required the homes to meet Level 6 of the Code for Sustainable Homes.
Morris Homes later obtained a section 73 permission which removed the operational carbon element of that condition. A bilateral planning obligation dated 25 October 2013 instead required financial contributions to offset carbon emissions. The amount was calculated by a formula and paid in stages before occupation of the 100th, 200th and 290th dwellings.
The council was to hold and spend the money on qualifying carbon-reduction projects in Peterborough. Projects were to be approved by a project board comprising representatives of the council, Morris Homes and Zero Carbon Hub Ltd. The agreement also contained an expert dispute-resolution clause and required unspent money to be returned after ten years.
What changed
Zero Carbon Hub ceased trading in March 2016 and was dissolved in September 2024. No project board had been established. Morris Homes contended that the board could not now be constituted as the agreement described it, so the contribution had become unworkable and no longer served a useful planning purpose.
The council refused Morris Homes’ application under section 106A to discharge the obligation. An inspector appointed by the Secretary of State dismissed the ensuing section 106B appeal. The High Court dismissed a judicial review challenge, and Morris Homes appealed.
The Court of Appeal’s approach
Lord Justice Lewison treated the issue as one of interpreting a public planning document against the same general principles that apply to contracts and other legal instruments. The agreement had to be read as a whole and in its planning context.
The court rejected the argument that the project board was incapable of operating without Zero Carbon Hub. Its role was not indispensable to the essential bargain. The council and developer remained able to identify and approve projects, and the expert clause supplied a mechanism if they could not agree.
The obligation also contained sufficiently clear criteria. Contributions had to fund projects in Peterborough, follow the principles in the attached report and achieve carbon reductions at least equivalent to the relevant dwelling emissions. The court considered those criteria capable of practical application despite later changes to national policy and the disappearance of Zero Carbon Hub.
The section 106A question
The statutory question was whether the obligation continued to serve a useful purpose. The Court of Appeal held that it did: the contribution still provided compensating carbon reductions for homes relieved from the earlier Level 6 requirement. The fact that the precise delivery machinery needed adaptation did not erase that purpose.
Lewison LJ emphasised the difference between interpreting the obligation and rewriting it. The court was not replacing the agreed carbon scheme with a new one. It was giving effect to the existing promise through the remaining workable provisions, including the objective criteria and dispute-resolution clause.
Reasons and outcome
The court also rejected the challenge to the inspector’s reasons. The decision letter dealt adequately with the central arguments and explained why the contribution could still be administered. The court was not persuaded that the inspector had overlooked a legally decisive point.
Lewison LJ dismissed the appeal. Zacaroli LJ and Lieven LJ agreed. The result left the planning obligation enforceable and the inspector’s refusal to modify it undisturbed.
Practical significance
The judgment is important where a section 106 agreement names a body, standard or delivery structure that later disappears. It does not establish that every obsolete mechanism can be ignored. The result depends on the wording, the underlying planning purpose, any objective criteria and whether the remaining machinery can still give the obligation practical effect.
Developers and authorities should therefore examine the whole agreement before assuming that institutional change has made an obligation unenforceable. Express fallback provisions and dispute-resolution clauses may be particularly important.
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