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R (on the application of Stern) v Horsham District Council [2013] EWHC 1460 (Admin)

In Stern, Leggatt J quashed two enforcement notices after Horsham District Council served them less than the required 28 days before they were due to take effect. The owner missed the deadline to appeal, partly because of his planning consultant’s late posting, but the council’s own breach of the statutory service period was also a material cause of the lost opportunity to challenge the notices.

The judgment was handed down in the High Court, Administrative Court, on 1 May 2013, case CO/2368/2012. It is reported as [2013] EWHC 1460 (Admin), [2013] PTSR 1502 and [2013] 3 All ER 798. It addresses the relationship between sections 172, 174 and 285 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, the right to a fair hearing and the availability of judicial review.

The key distinction is between a notice that was not served on a person who should receive it and a notice that was served on the correct person but too late. The High Court treated those defects differently for the purposes of the statutory ground (e) appeal, preserving a route to judicial review where late service had undermined the opportunity to appeal.

The enforcement notices and the missed appeal

The Barn at Henfield had been subject to two enforcement notices issued on 6 December 2011. One related to a change of use from agricultural or storage use to residential use; the other alleged unauthorised alterations. Both notices stated that they would take effect on 4 January 2012, with six months allowed for compliance after that date.

Section 172(3)(b) required the notices to be served at least 28 days before their effective date. Service should therefore have occurred by 7 December. In fact the council served the notices on 9 December, reducing the period available for the owner to prepare an appeal.

The owner instructed a planning consultant and began preparing statutory appeals. The consultant posted the forms on 3 January 2012 by guaranteed next-day delivery; they arrived on 4 January, which was too late because a section 174 appeal had to be made before the notices took effect. The Planning Inspectorate could not extend that absolute statutory deadline.

Why ground (e) did not bar judicial review

Section 174(2)(e) allows an appeal on the ground that copies of an enforcement notice were not served as required by section 172. Section 285 generally bars another challenge to the notice’s validity on matters that could have formed a statutory enforcement appeal. Horsham argued that the late-service complaint belonged exclusively within ground (e), and that the owner’s failure to appeal in time therefore barred judicial review.

Leggatt J rejected that broad reading. He construed ground (e) narrowly as concerning the failure to serve the required persons under section 172(2), rather than service upon those persons outside the time limit in section 172(3). This meant that the late-service challenge was not excluded by section 285 and could be examined by the High Court.

The judge reasoned that the wider interpretation could produce an extreme injustice. If a council served a notice only shortly before its effective date, an owner might be unable to lodge any timely appeal. The statutory time limit for an appeal could not be extended, yet the wider interpretation would also prohibit a later court challenge. The narrow interpretation was supported by ordinary statutory construction and by the right to a fair hearing under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Concurrent fault and substantial prejudice

The council argued that the consultant, not the short service, had caused the lost appeal opportunity. The consultant could have sent the forms electronically or delivered them sooner; his choice to post them late was a mistake. The High Court accepted that the consultant had been at fault but rejected the assertion that the council’s breach therefore caused no prejudice.

Leggatt J found two concurrent causes. Had the consultant acted properly, the appeal would have been lodged in time despite the council’s late service. Equally, had the council served in time or set a later effective date, the appeal would have arrived before the deadline even with the consultant’s conduct. The council’s statutory breach had therefore materially contributed to a substantial loss of the opportunity to challenge the notices.

That prejudice justified quashing both notices. The owner did not need to show that his underlying planning appeal would necessarily have succeeded. The immediate injury was the loss of a statutory opportunity to contest the notices in a procedure whose deadlines were strictly enforced.

No automatic duty to withdraw and reissue

The owner had also argued, in the alternative, that Horsham acted unlawfully in refusing to withdraw and reissue the notices after the short service was pointed out. The judge did not accept that there was an automatic statutory duty to withdraw and reissue every notice served late. That was a discretionary decision subject to ordinary public-law review; the owner’s alternative arguments did not establish that it had been exercised unlawfully.

The outcome was nevertheless that both enforcement notices were quashed on the primary ground. The court did not determine that the alleged residential use or alterations were acceptable in planning terms, and its decision was not a grant of planning permission. It concerned the validity of the notices and the owner’s lost procedural opportunity.

The complete transcript also records that Leggatt J awarded the claimant his costs without apportionment, notwithstanding the unsuccessful alternative arguments. The claimant’s costs schedule initially sought £19,530.80; proposed reductions for hearing attendance and travel were discussed, with the final amount left for the parties to calculate and submit for the order. The judgment must not be read as awarding the full amount initially claimed.

Stern compared with Mayes and later case law

Stern belongs in the same general family of enforcement notice service cases as the historical Mayes authority, but it answers a different question. Mayes is cited in later Inspector decisions in relation to failure to serve a person affected by an enforcement notice and the consequences of substantial prejudice. Stern concerns short service on a person who actually received the notice and whose statutory appeal period was effectively reduced. The Stern judgment itself does not cite Mayes.

The later High Court case R (Rahimian) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2016] EWHC 1634 (Admin) cited Stern in explaining the absolute deadline for bringing enforcement appeals. It did not transform Stern into a general power to accept late appeals. The narrow judicial review route arose because the council had itself breached the statutory service period.

For enforcement practitioners, the practical checks are the date of issue, each date of service, the notice’s effective date, the persons served and the method and timing of any appeal submission. The statutory questions under section 172 and section 174 should be considered separately. The Planning Geek enforcement appeal grounds guide explains the available grounds and their evidence requirements.

Full judgment

The complete judgment, including the court’s consideration of costs, is available to Gold members below.

The formal citation is R (on the application of Stern) v Horsham District Council [2013] EWHC 1460 (Admin); [2013] PTSR 1502; [2013] 3 All ER 798, High Court (Administrative Court), Leggatt J, 1 May 2013.

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