Thames Heliports Plc v London Borough of Tower Hamlets (1997) 74 P&CR 164
Thames Heliports is an unusual but important Court of Appeal case on planning control over activities carried out from a vessel on tidal water. A proposed floating heliport would move along the Thames and stop at different locations while helicopters landed and took off. The court held that this activity was capable of amounting to a material change in the use of land even though the vessel would not be moored to the river bed or banks.
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- Neutral citation
- (1997) 74 P&CR 164
- Court
- Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
- Judgment date
- 28th November 1996
- Judge
- Lord Justice Beldam, Lord Justice Ward and Lord Justice Schiemann
What Thames Heliports proposed
Thames Heliports Plc proposed converting a former passenger vessel into a floating heliport. The vessel would navigate along about ten miles of the tidal Thames between Chelsea and Greenwich and stop at one of 22 proposed locations.
At those locations it would hold position in mid-river while helicopters landed and took off. The vessel would not be moored or attached to the river bed or banks. The proposal contemplated up to 22,000 helicopter movements a year.
The company went to court seeking declarations that the proposal did not require planning permission or, alternatively, that temporary-use permitted development rights would authorise it.
Planning law can apply to activity on water
The company argued that flowing water was not land and that a vessel floating above the river bed could not therefore change the use of land.
The Court of Appeal accepted for the purposes of the case that the relevant land was the bed and banks of the river rather than the flowing water itself.
But that did not end the planning question. Planning control is not confined to physical alterations of soil or buildings. The use of land can change because of the activities carried on in connection with it and the environmental effects of those activities.
The environmental point of view was crucial
Lord Justice Schiemann rejected an analysis which looked only at the physics of the river bed continuing to support water and vessels.
The planning legislation is concerned with the human environment. The question is whether the activity changes the use of the land in a way which is capable of being material from an environmental point of view.
A vessel holding station while repeated helicopter movements took place was plainly capable of having significant noise and visual effects on people using and living around the river.
The court did not decide that a material change must occur
The High Court had declared that the floating heliport would constitute a change of use. The Court of Appeal considered that too definite.
Whether a change of use is actually material is a planning judgment on the facts. Parliament had entrusted that value judgment primarily to the planning authorities rather than the court.
The Court of Appeal therefore made the narrower declaration that helicopters landing on or taking off from the floating vessel could constitute a change of use of land for section 55 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990.
That distinction remains important. Thames Heliports does not establish that every activity from every boat automatically requires planning permission.
The planning unit could not be fixed in advance
The company also relied on the temporary-use permitted development right, which at the time allowed land to be used temporarily for up to 28 days in a calendar year.
It argued that each of the 22 proposed stopping locations should be treated separately, potentially giving a fresh temporary-use allowance at each location.
The Court of Appeal refused to decide the planning unit in advance. The boundaries of the relevant planning unit are normally a question of fact and degree for the planning authority and, where appropriate, an Inspector on appeal.
The purpose and practical unity of the activity can matter. Separate geographical points do not necessarily become separate planning units simply because the vessel moves between them.
Temporary permitted development cannot be multiplied by artificial site boundaries
The court did not finally decide whether the whole ten-mile operation, groups of nearby locations or individual locations were the correct planning unit.
What it rejected was the attempt to obtain a declaration preventing the planning decision-maker from examining that factual issue.
When a temporary-use right applies to any land for any purpose, the decision-maker is entitled to identify the relevant land with the purpose and practical operation in mind. Artificially drawing the smallest possible boundary does not determine the answer.
Courts are cautious about hypothetical planning declarations
Thames Heliports is also a useful procedural case. The Court of Appeal stressed that planning legislation provides routes for determining whether a proposed use would be lawful, including what is now the certificate procedure under section 192.
Courts can make anticipatory declarations in planning cases, but they should be cautious about deciding mixed questions of fact and law before the planning authorities have exercised the judgment Parliament gave them.
Why the case matters for boats and floating accommodation
The case is regularly cited where somebody argues that planning control cannot apply because an activity takes place from a boat rather than on conventional dry land.
That argument is too simple. A boat can remain a movable vessel while the activity associated with it is still capable of changing the planning use of the relevant land or water-side planning unit.
Whether permission is actually required will still depend on the facts, including the nature, location, duration and environmental effects of the activity.
This is particularly relevant to residential boats, floating businesses and proposals to use vessels as short-term accommodation. Our broader guide is the serviced accommodation planning permission page.
Thames Heliports and KP JR Management
The later case of KP JR Management v Richmond concerned residential boats and a certificate of lawfulness. It drew on Thames Heliports and the wider planning-unit authorities when considering the relationship between the moorings, pontoons and vessels.
The cases are useful together. Thames Heliports establishes that river-based activity can engage planning control and that the planning unit is fact-sensitive. KP JR applies those ideas in a residential mooring context.
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Thames Heliports Case Law Page Updated: 10th September 2026