A Devon container appeal has failed after a Planning Inspector decided that two shipping containers were operational development and that surrounding land had been put to an unauthorised storage use. Crucially, the Inspector also corrected an enforcement notice that attempted to describe the containers simultaneously as part of a material change of use and as building operations.
Inspector M Bale dismissed appeal APP/X1118/C/25/3362590 on 9th October 2026, upholding North Devon District Council’s notice against land south of 2 Bredwick Cottages at Kentisbury, near Barnstaple. The case concerned two containers, a blue animal transport vehicle, a white trailer and other items kept on the land. The appellant said that some activity was associated with agriculture and that the containers were temporary.
For landowners, farmers and enforcement officers, the decision is a practical reminder that the status of a container depends on its circumstances, not its label. Storage of objects on land can also raise a distinct change-of-use issue. The outcome turned on permanence, the actual uses evidenced, the drafting of the notice and the absence of persuasive evidence supporting the statutory grounds of appeal.
Facing an enforcement notice over containers, storage or agricultural land? A properly evidenced response can determine which grounds are available and what an Inspector can correct. Contact Planning Geek about an enforcement appraisal.
Devon container appeal: what the notice alleged
North Devon District Council issued the enforcement notice on 5th February 2025. It described a storage use involving vehicles, a trailer, gas bottles, ladders, scrap, waste materials and two shipping containers. It also alleged that placing the containers amounted to operational development. The notice required the cessation of open storage and removal of the containers, stored items and resulting materials within three calendar months.
The appeal was pursued under grounds (b), (c), (d), (f) and (g) in section 174(2) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. Those grounds raised different questions: whether the alleged activities had occurred; whether they breached planning control; whether enforcement was time-barred; whether the notice demanded more than necessary; and whether the compliance period was too short.
The appeal was not a ground (a) merits application for retrospective planning permission. The Inspector therefore examined the factual and legal claims made against the notice, rather than deciding whether the storage activities might be acceptable under a fresh planning application. This distinction can be decisive when choosing grounds of appeal.
One activity cannot be described twice in contradictory ways
The original allegation counted the containers within the change to storage use while separately describing their siting as operational development. The Inspector said that approach was inconsistent because the same containers could not, on the Council’s particular case, be both elements of the change of use and separate building works in the manner alleged.
The Council clarified in its appeal statement that it considered the containers to be operational development owing to weight and permanence. The appellant understood that case and had a chance to respond. The Inspector therefore exercised the power to correct the notice without causing injustice to either party.
The correction removed the containers from the description of items forming the storage change of use, while retaining their siting as a separate operational-development allegation. Other unnecessary wording, including references to particular retrospective time periods within the allegation itself, was also corrected. This did not extinguish the notice: the appeal still failed.
Enforcement notices must communicate the alleged breach and the steps to remedy it with sufficient certainty. A drafting problem does not automatically defeat an enforcement notice where an Inspector can lawfully correct it without injustice. Equally, an authority cannot assume that every defect is harmless. The precise facts, opportunities to respond and extent of any prejudice matter.
Why the Inspector treated the containers as buildings
On ground (b), the appellant said that the containers were not permanent buildings. They were said to rest on sleepers rather than foundations and to be capable of relocation. The evidence also indicated, however, that ground had been prepared with scalpings or similar material and that moving the containers would require substantial effort.
The Inspector considered the containers’ apparent permanence and the indicated ongoing requirement for them. On the balance of probabilities, their placement amounted to a building operation. It was not necessary to find that they were physically anchored to conventional foundations before concluding that operational development had occurred.
This reinforces a theme from Planning Geek’s earlier Rayleigh shipping container appeal, in which numerous storage containers were also treated as buildings. The particular factors are different in each case. The separate Surrey lawful development certificate appeal illustrates why historical evidence and the relevant statutory test must be analysed independently.
Agricultural claims needed evidence of actual agricultural use
The appellant suggested that objects on the site related to agriculture and that the containers were used, at least in part, for hay and equipment associated with hedgelaying. She also referred to animals kept on land elsewhere. However, evidence showed that the containers had not always been used for agricultural purposes and had probably first served domestic storage.
The Inspector was not satisfied that the uses described established an agricultural purpose for the containers or for other items. There was insufficient evidence that the blue animal transporter had actually been used for animal transport. The continuing presence of vehicles, a trailer and miscellaneous materials supported a conclusion of storage rather than agricultural activity on this land.
Even if a holding enjoys agricultural permitted development rights, it does not follow that a container is permitted merely because it might theoretically store agricultural equipment. The purpose and actual connection to the qualifying agricultural use require evidence, alongside the specific limitations and conditions of any claimed permitted development right.
The Inspector regarded the storage activity as materially different from the agricultural use advanced on the appellant’s behalf. Ground (c), asserting that the matters did not breach planning control, therefore failed. The case does not establish that all storage on farms requires permission: the conclusion is specific to the evidence and operations before the Inspector.
Missing dates defeated the immunity argument
Ground (d) was also unsuccessful. The appellant did not supply persuasive records proving that either the storage use or the containers had existed for long enough to place them beyond enforcement action at the date of the notice. The fact that an item had been on site for some time was not enough without evidence satisfying the applicable legal test.
The time limits under section 171B have changed for breaches occurring after the 2024 commencement of relevant amendments, with transitional protection for earlier breaches. A lawful development certificate or enforcement defence therefore needs the correct distinction between operational development and a change of use, the relevant dates, and a coherent evidential chronology.
Planning Geek’s broader guide to challenges following enforcement appeals explains the separate court route where an Inspector’s decision is challenged on a point of law. It is not an opportunity simply to reargue factual matters that could have been supported with evidence at the planning appeal.
Removal and three-month compliance period upheld
Under ground (f), the appellant argued that removal was excessive. The Inspector concluded that ending the unauthorised storage and removing the containers and items were necessary to remedy the breaches. A notice could not compel the appellant to start using the objects agriculturally; it could, however, require unlawful activities to cease and operational development to be removed.
There were also practical objections to ground (g), including disabilities affecting the appellant and a farmer associated with the site, difficult winter ground conditions and the need to use specialist lifting contractors. The Inspector considered those points but found no sufficient supporting evidence showing that the three-month period was unreasonable in the circumstances.
No specialist lifting evidence had been supplied to establish when or why works could not be undertaken. The Inspector also noted that the Council could consider an extension of the compliance period if suitable evidence emerged. That possibility did not justify changing the period on the material before the appeal.
What landowners and planning professionals should take away
Three practical issues stand out. First, classify the alleged development carefully: the siting of a physical container and the use of surrounding land for storage are not necessarily one and the same breach. Secondly, obtain dated photographs, invoices, occupation records, operational logs and evidence of actual agricultural activity rather than relying on broad recollections.
Thirdly, prepare evidence specific to each ground of appeal. Ground (b) addresses the fact of the activity, ground (c) its legal status, ground (d) the time limits, ground (f) the remedial requirements and ground (g) the time allowed. A practical hardship argument is stronger when supported by contractor reports, access assessments or medical and operational evidence relevant to the actual timetable.
In the Devon container appeal, none of those grounds succeeded. The Inspector upheld the enforcement notice with corrections, preserving the requirement to end the storage use and remove the containers. It is an Inspector’s planning enforcement decision, not a court judgment or a universal rule about every movable container.
Primary decision: APP/X1118/C/25/3362590, decided 9th October 2026. The original appeal can also be located through the Planning Inspectorate case reference. This article concerns England.
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