An enforcement notice defect has led a Planning Inspector to quash East Riding of Yorkshire Council’s notice against mixed residential and storage uses at 100 Spellowgate, Driffield. The decision, issued on 21st October 2026, turned on the wording of the enforcement requirements rather than whether the activities were acceptable in planning terms.
The council alleged a change from a nil use to a mixed use involving residential accommodation, storage and distribution, including public self-storage. Yet the steps required by its notice stopped short of requiring that alleged mixed use to cease across the site. That difference proved decisive.
I think this is a particularly useful reminder for anyone drafting, receiving or appealing an enforcement notice. The description of the breach and the steps demanded must work together. A notice that seeks less than it alleges can have consequences its author did not intend.
Why the enforcement notice defect mattered
The council issued the notice on 15 April 2025. It sought to stop residential use, remove domestic fixtures and equipment, stop most storage and distribution activities, remove shipping containers and take away associated vehicles and equipment. One building, identified in blue on the notice plan, was expressly excluded from the requirement to cease storage and distribution.
The allegation, however, was not framed as separate, independent breaches relating to different parts of the land. It was framed as a single material change of use to a mixed residential and storage and distribution use. That distinction explains the enforcement notice defect.
Inspector Chris Baxter considered whether compliance with every step in the notice would leave some of the alleged mixed use in place. It would. In particular, the wording would not expressly end the mixed use as a whole, while storage and distribution would continue in the building the council had excluded.
Section 173(11) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 contains a sometimes-overlooked consequence of under-enforcement. Where a notice could have required an activity to cease but does not, full compliance with the steps it actually specifies can mean that planning permission is treated as having been granted for the activity left untouched.
This is a conditional statutory effect, not a permission granted simply because someone has lodged an appeal. In Driffield, the Inspector found that upholding the notice as written could have produced an unconditional deemed permission for the very mixed use the council intended to address. That was the unintended outcome at the heart of the enforcement notice defect.
Could the Inspector correct the enforcement notice?
The Inspector did not have to quash the notice merely because its wording was defective. Section 176 of the 1990 Act provides a power to correct errors or vary an enforcement notice where doing so would not cause injustice to the parties. The Inspector therefore examined whether a correction could resolve the problem fairly.
The council said it had deliberately separated the activities within the steps because it regarded some enforcement as unnecessary, and was willing to accept a correction if one was needed. The appellant argued that a correction requiring cessation of the entire alleged mixed use would materially change the obligations against which the appeal had been prepared.
Inspector Baxter agreed that a workable correction could not simply preserve the council’s intended partial requirements. Because the residential element was within a building also used for storage and distribution, requiring the alleged mixed use to cease across the site would also catch storage activity in the blue-marked building.
That would make compliance more onerous for the appellant, extending the restrictions beyond the notice originally served. The Inspector found that this would cause injustice. The enforcement notice defect could not therefore be repaired using the statutory correction power.
On 21st October 2026 the Inspector quashed the notice as invalid. He did not determine the substantive appeal grounds (a), (b) and (f). There was no decision granting permission for the mixed use and no substantive finding that every activity on the land was lawful.
What happened to the separate costs application?
The appellant also sought a full award of appeal costs, alleging that the council had acted unreasonably, including through misinformation and inadequate evidence concerning residential use, containers, self-storage, vehicle movements and parking.
That application failed in a separate costs decision issued on the same day. Inspector Baxter considered the council’s subsequent statement and photographic material sufficient to substantiate why it had taken enforcement action. The fact that the notice was invalid did not, by itself, establish unreasonable behaviour causing unnecessary or wasted appeal expense.
It is important not to confuse those conclusions. The council lost its enforcement notice because of its drafting, but the Inspector did not find grounds for ordering the council to pay the appellant’s costs. The outcome is a useful example of the different tests applied to validity and to costs.
What might happen next in Driffield?
Quashing the notice removes that notice; it does not finally resolve the lawfulness or planning merits of the alleged uses. The Inspector expressly noted that the council could explore its powers under section 171B(4) of the 1990 Act to take further action. Whether further enforcement is available, and on what terms, would need a separate assessment.
The enforcement notice defect therefore gives neither side a complete answer to the underlying land-use dispute. It does show why the precise allegation, the site plan and every required step deserve close scrutiny before a notice is served or an appeal is prepared.
Practical lessons from this enforcement notice defect
For local planning authorities, start by deciding whether the breach to be alleged is one mixed use or several distinct uses. Then test every step against that allegation. If the intention is deliberately to under-enforce, consider the possible deemed permission under section 173(11) and whether it is acceptable. Do not assume that leaving a building or activity out of the steps is legally neutral.
For owners, occupiers and advisers, read beyond the headline allegation. The operative steps govern what is actually demanded. An enforcement notice defect may make correction impossible if the proposed fix would substantially increase the burden of compliance, but the outcome will always depend on the particular notice, evidence and injustice test.
Our guide to under-enforcement and deemed planning permission explains the statutory mechanism. The relevant provisions can also be checked in section 173 and section 176 of the 1990 Act, alongside the Government’s planning enforcement guidance.
Driffield decision and sources
Appeal APP/E2001/C/25/3366391, East Riding of Yorkshire Council, was determined by Inspector Chris Baxter on 21st October 2026. The enforcement notice was quashed. A separate application for costs was refused. These are Planning Inspectorate appeal and costs decisions, not court judgments.
The primary appeal and separate costs documents are associated with the official Planning Inspectorate case record. The appeal decision is also available on AppealBase.
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