Blackpool Borough Council has secured a permanent section 187B planning injunction requiring two members of a Romani Gypsy family to leave an unauthorised Traveller site at Marton Moss within 21 days — despite the High Court finding repeated failures to discharge the Public Sector Equality Duty.
Blackpool Borough Council v Beale & Ors [2026] EWHC 2237 (KB), handed down on 28th August 2026, is useful far beyond the immediate dispute. It shows why equality duties must be dealt with properly throughout planning enforcement, but also why a failure to comply with the duty does not automatically prevent an injunction where the court is satisfied that lawful compliance would not have produced a substantially different decision.
The judgment also considers Article 8, the interests of children, alternative accommodation and the limits of orders against “persons unknown” following the Supreme Court’s decision in Wolverhampton.
What happened at Marton Moss?
The site is at the north-east corner of School Road and Midgeland Road on the eastern edge of Blackpool. The judge described the surrounding area as semi-rural. The land lies within the Marton Moss Conservation Area and was protected as Open Land by the development plan.
The three named defendants — Alice Ester Beale, Laurence Boswell and Otheyboy Boswell-Jones — are freehold owners of the land, members of the extended Boswell family and Romani Gypsy Travellers.
By February 2024, hardcore had been laid and electricity and water infrastructure installed. Blackpool authorised enforcement action on 27th March 2024 and served enforcement notices on 5th June. The notices required residential development to cease and the unauthorised works, including hardcore, services, fencing and footings, to be removed.
An enforcement appeal was dismissed in December 2025. The compliance period ultimately expired on 12th April 2026. Rather than the land being reinstated, further works took place and caravans were brought onto the site. By early May, Beale and Boswell-Jones were living there with their families. Boswell did not move onto the land and already had an authorised pitch elsewhere.
Blackpool obtained a limited interim injunction without notice on 15th May 2026. It was continued in modified form on 5th June until the expedited trial.
A fresh planning application did not stop the injunction claim
The defendants submitted a new planning application on 1st June 2026. After validation issues, it was validated on 27th July and sought permission for four permanent Traveller pitches, each with a static caravan, touring caravan and associated facilities.
The defendants argued that if an injunction was granted, departure should at least be postponed until that application — and any appeal — had finally been determined. The judge rejected that approach. He considered permission for the proposal to be extremely unlikely, particularly because the planning inspector had already rejected permanent development of the site and serious conflicts remained around open land, conservation-area character, flood risk and other policies.
A pending or retrospective planning application does not, by itself, suspend planning enforcement. It may be relevant to the court’s discretion, but it does not erase an existing breach or prevent section 187B relief where the circumstances justify it.
What is a section 187B planning injunction?
Section 187B planning injunctions are one of the strongest remedies available to a local planning authority. Under section 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, an LPA may apply to the High Court or county court where it considers it necessary or expedient to restrain an actual or apprehended breach of planning control, whether or not it has already exercised its other enforcement powers.
The court can grant whatever injunction it thinks appropriate to restrain the breach. That makes an injunction fundamentally different from an enforcement notice. An enforcement notice is an administrative enforcement step with a statutory appeal route. An injunction is a court order, and breach can amount to contempt of court.
The remedy is discretionary. Drawing on South Bucks v Porter and Ipswich Borough Council v Fairview Hotels, the judge emphasised that the court may weigh matters such as:
- the seriousness and flagrancy of the planning breach
- the site’s planning history and previous enforcement
- urgency and the risk of further unauthorised development
- the planning harm being caused
- personal circumstances, hardship and Convention rights
- whether conventional enforcement has proved sufficient
- whether an injunction is a commensurate and proportionate remedy
The normal route remains an enforcement notice, but section 187B exists for cases where court restraint is justified. Our wider guide to types of planning enforcement explains how the different tools fit together.
The planning harm was serious — but there was no finding of nuisance
The court considered the breach flagrant. Development had continued after negative pre-application advice, formal enforcement, an unsuccessful appeal and expiry of the compliance period. The judge accepted that the open and natural character of the junction and the Marton Moss Conservation Area were being harmed.
There is an important point here. The judgment expressly records that there was no evidence that the defendants had caused nuisance through rubbish, anti-social behaviour or similar conduct. Nor was there a basis for fearing occupation beyond the four family plots being pursued through the planning application.
The case was therefore about the planning consequences of unauthorised development and the deliberate enforcement history, not a stereotype about Traveller occupation.
Children, family life and alternative accommodation all mattered
Beale lived on the site with four children, including a younger child with ADHD, and gave evidence about her own health. Boswell-Jones lived there with his wife and two young children. Their ethnic identity, family life, desire for stability, the interests of the children and the practical consequences of leaving were all relevant to the proportionality exercise.
These issues sit alongside the principles explained in our guides to Gypsy and Traveller sites and human rights in planning enforcement.
The court also considered accommodation. The planning authority was not required, as a condition of enforcing planning control, to provide a replacement pitch. Ordinary homelessness assistance remained a possible route, although the judge recognised that accommodation which prevented a travelling lifestyle might not be acceptable to the families.
Evidence before the court also identified a site in the Fylde area, around five miles away, with permission for five additional pitches that were understood to be serviced and available. The defendants produced no evidence contradicting that point. The judge was not persuaded that roadside or service-station stopping was their only realistic alternative.
Blackpool failed the Public Sector Equality Duty at three stages
The major practitioner point is the council’s handling of the Public Sector Equality Duty under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010.
The court repeated the established Bracking principles. A public authority must be aware of the duty, exercise it in substance with rigour and an open mind, and do so at the relevant decision-making stage. It is not a box-ticking exercise, it is non-delegable and it is a continuing duty. A formal equality impact assessment is not invariably required, but a proper recorded assessment is powerful evidence that the necessary thinking has actually happened.
The judge found failures at three distinct points:
- The 2024 enforcement decision — Blackpool had not properly addressed the PSED when it authorised and served the enforcement notices
- The May 2026 interim injunction decision — there was again no equality impact assessment or specific PSED consideration before urgent interim relief was sought
- The final injunction decision — the council had considered human rights and proportionality, but the judge was not satisfied that the decision-maker had consciously addressed Romani Gypsy status, the Equality Act and the full PSED, or reassessed matters after the defendants served detailed witness evidence
That final failure is especially useful. Because the PSED is continuing, a council cannot assume that an assessment made earlier in an enforcement case is enough forever. New evidence about protected characteristics, children, health or accommodation may require a fresh assessment before the next major decision.
Why did those PSED failures not defeat the injunction?
The answer lies in the remedial approach from Forward v Aldwyck Housing Group Ltd [2019] EWCA Civ 1334. The court asked whether, on the particular facts, it was highly likely that the council’s decision would not have been substantially different had the PSED been performed lawfully.
For the 2024 enforcement notices, the site was not occupied and the council was facing a clear, deliberate planning breach. The defendants also had a full appeal route. The judge considered it inconceivable that proper PSED compliance would have changed the decision to enforce.
For the interim injunction, the situation was fast-moving. Two families had moved onto the site immediately after the enforcement compliance period, an empty caravan and an empty plot created a risk of further intensification, and the welfare checks had raised no issue requiring a different immediate response. Again, the PSED breach was real but did not materially alter the decision.
By the final hearing, the council knew much more and should have reassessed the duty after the detailed witness statements. Even then, the judge found that proper compliance would not have changed the fundamental decision to pursue an injunction. The history of deliberate non-compliance, serious planning harm, very poor prospects of planning permission and absence of evidence showing a compelling need to remain on this particular site were decisive.
That does not turn the PSED into a technicality. The failures remained unlawful deficiencies in the council’s decision-making. The point is that a PSED breach does not automatically produce a particular remedy where the court concludes that lawful compliance would highly likely have led to substantially the same decision.
Gypsy and Traveller status does not prevent planning enforcement
Romani Gypsies are protected by the Equality Act as an ethnic group. Article 8 can also be engaged where planning enforcement interferes with home, private and family life, and the courts recognise that stationing a caravan can be integral to Gypsy identity and a traditional travelling lifestyle. The best interests of affected children are a primary consideration.
None of that creates immunity from planning control. It requires the authority — and ultimately the court — to understand and weigh those factors properly. They can influence whether enforcement is pursued, the form of enforcement, the time allowed for compliance and the proportionality of the order.
Equally, Beale is not authority for councils to approach equality casually because Blackpool ultimately obtained its injunction. The judgment is actually a warning to reassess equality duties throughout the enforcement process and to keep a proper record.
Why did “persons unknown” relief fail?
Blackpool also sought a permanent order against unidentified future occupiers. That brought in Wolverhampton City Council and others v London Gypsies and Travellers and others [2023] UKSC 47.
The Supreme Court confirmed that courts can, in appropriate cases, grant so-called newcomer injunctions against persons who are not yet identifiable defendants. But the safeguards matter. There must be a compelling need, procedural protection, proper territorial and temporal limits, and the order must be just and convenient.
Those requirements were not met here. The evidence was that the owners wanted the land for themselves and potentially one connected family. There was no evidential basis for fearing occupation by unconnected newcomers. In addition, the injunction against the named owners already prevented them from instructing, encouraging or permitting others to carry out the prohibited development.
The judge therefore refused to continue the injunction against persons unknown. Wolverhampton establishes jurisdiction; it does not hand LPAs a general entitlement to newcomer orders.
What did the High Court finally order?
Blackpool had asked for Beale and Boswell-Jones to leave within 14 days. The judge considered 21 days more reasonable and granted permanent injunctive relief substantially in the council’s proposed terms against them.
Boswell had never taken up residential occupation of the site and already had an authorised pitch elsewhere. The court was prepared to accept a modified undertaking from him, which has the same enforceable effect as an injunction in the terms given.
No permanent relief was granted against persons unknown.
The result is therefore more nuanced than “council wins”. Blackpool succeeded on the core planning remedy, but the court identified repeated PSED failures, adjusted the departure period and rejected the broad persons-unknown limb.
Practical lessons from Blackpool v Beale
- Address section 149 properly before each significant enforcement decision
- Revisit equality when new evidence about protected characteristics, children or accommodation emerges
- Keep a written record that demonstrates substance rather than box-ticking
- Do not assume a pending planning application prevents section 187B relief
- Base an injunction case on actual planning harm and enforcement history, not generalised assertions about occupiers
- For persons unknown, identify the compelling need and safeguards required by Wolverhampton
- Remember that the court controls the remedy and can alter the LPA’s proposed compliance period
Primary sources
This article is based on the full judgment in Blackpool Borough Council v Beale & Ors [2026] EWHC 2237 (KB), the statutory wording of section 187B TCPA 1990 and section 149 Equality Act 2010, together with the Supreme Court’s decision in Wolverhampton.
Created: 29th August 2026 | section 187B planning injunction
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