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Shrewsbury flats fail over unsafe flood escape routes

The Pump House flats would sit above the predicted flood level, but the Inspector found that access, evacuation and rescue remained unsafe.

Seven Shrewsbury flats proposed above offices at the Pump House on Coton Hill have lost a planning appeal over flood safety. Inspector H Smith dismissed the appeal on 14th October 2026, finding that residents could become stranded even though the flats themselves would be above the predicted flood level.

The scheme would have converted the building’s first and second floors into homes, with offices retained below and no external appearance changes. Shropshire Council had refused prior approval under Class MA, the English permitted development route for converting certain commercial premises into housing. The appeal leaves that refusal in place.

For me, the crucial distinction is between keeping the living rooms dry and keeping the people safe. Residents still need to get in, get out and obtain help during a prolonged flood. At this riverside building, the Inspector found that warnings and refuge upstairs did not provide a sufficiently reliable answer, particularly for people with reduced mobility.

Why the Shrewsbury flats flood assessment failed

The Pump House stands beside the River Severn and much of the site is in Flood Zone 3, indicating a high probability of flooding. It has lower and upper ground floors as well as the first and second floors proposed for conversion. Five Shrewsbury flats were planned on the first floor and two on the second.

The flood assessment put the design flood elevation at 53.64 metres above the standard reference level, including its stated climate-change allowance. The first floor was at 56.60 metres, so the Inspector accepted that both residential floors would be safe from inundation in that event.

However, the ground floor and lower foyer could flood. The Environment Agency indicated potential depths of up to 2.54 metres around the site. The decision also records that Coton Hill road was expected to flood in events greater than the one-in-two-year event, with no completely dry exit routes available once it flooded.

The Shrewsbury flats evacuation plan proposed staying in a safe haven on the upper floors if a safe exit was not available, until water retreated or emergency services evacuated residents. The Inspector found significant gaps in how that arrangement would operate during a prolonged event.

A higher car park was not a safe destination

The appellant suggested that residents could leave through the rear into the parking area, which was higher than other parts of the site. The Inspector found that people could become trapped there because lower ground elsewhere, including the exit onto Coton Hill road, could flood around them.

The alternative route through the lower-ground-floor foyer was also unsuitable for evacuation because that space could flood. The flood assessment anticipated fairly fast-moving water flowing south through the site, reaching a level described as a danger to most people in extreme events.

In the full official decision, the Inspector said the warning system “does not replace the need for a clearly safe and reliable access and egress route”. Signing up for alerts did not guarantee that every resident would leave early enough.

The Shrewsbury flats plan did not identify where evacuated residents would be taken to safety. It also failed to explain how people stranded upstairs or in the parking area would be rescued. These were practical safety uncertainties, not simply an objection to the wording of the document.

Residents with reduced mobility needed a workable plan

The lift would not operate during a flood. No evidence demonstrated how residents with physical impairments or reduced mobility could evacuate safely without assistance. Nor had safe vehicle access for emergency services during the design flood been established.

The Inspector found a realistic prospect of residents relying on emergency services for evacuation and rescue. That could impose an unacceptable burden on those services and expose people to an unacceptable risk to life. The proposal had not been shown safe throughout its lifetime.

For the Shrewsbury flats, the possibility that water would eventually retreat was insufficient. A prolonged event could prevent residents leaving for a significant period. I would expect a workable plan to explain how the actual occupiers and access arrangements would cope, rather than assume everyone could manage the stairs or wait indefinitely upstairs.

The Inspector also rejected leaving these unresolved matters to planning conditions. On the evidence before him, the effectiveness of evacuation remained too uncertain. That is a finding about this submitted scheme and evidence, rather than a universal prohibition on upper-floor housing beside rivers.

Class MA still required flood-risk approval

The parties agreed that the proposal met the Class MA eligibility requirements considered under paragraph MA.1. The disputed issue was paragraph MA.2(2)(c), which requires prior approval consideration of flooding risks in relation to the building.

That distinction matters for purchasers considering commercial conversions. Meeting the route’s initial eligibility tests does not establish that every prior approval issue is acceptable. Planning Geek’s Class MA guide explains the route and its separate limitations and conditions.

The Shrewsbury flats would bring economic and social benefits, including seven homes in an accessible location and support for local services. The lack of external alterations also meant a neutral effect on the Shrewsbury Conservation Area and the Ravens Meadow Special Character Area. Neither point removed the flood-safety problem.

The appellant referred to earlier council approvals where upper-floor refuge had been accepted without a dry route. The Inspector lacked the full circumstances needed to treat them as directly comparable and noted that they predated the revised national Framework. Each proposal still needed assessment on its own evidence.

Appeal 6012541 concerned Indigo Seven Limited’s application 25/04559/PA3MA. The official appeal record confirms the dismissal. Anyone reconsidering this building needs to address safe access, evacuation destinations, vulnerable residents and emergency access together. The dry upper floors were only one part of that assessment.

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