John Lund v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government & Anor [2026] EWHC 2474 (Admin)

The point in plain English: A legal power to carry out road improvements is not proof that the authority holding that power will use it. In John Lund, the High Court refused permission to challenge an Inspector’s conclusion that necessary highway works had no prospect of delivery within three years.

John Lund concerns a proposed Grampian condition and a unilateral undertaking intended to secure improvements to an unadopted street. The developer offered to fund the works, but delivery still depended on Kirklees Council choosing to exercise discretionary private street works powers.

John Lund: the case and its procedural status

Deputy High Court Judge Karen Ridge delivered judgment on 1st October 2026 following a hearing on 7th September 2026. The claimant sought permission under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to challenge the Secretary of State’s appeal decision dated 23rd December 2025.

The Inspector had dismissed an appeal for 33 dwellings at Oddfellows Street, Cleckheaton, because the necessary access improvements were not realistically deliverable. The court refused permission to bring the statutory challenge. It did not quash the appeal decision or grant planning permission.

This procedural distinction matters. The judgment addresses whether the proposed grounds disclosed an arguable error of law. It should not be described as a successful judicial review, or as a judgment after a full substantive determination of a section 288 claim.

Why the highway works mattered in John Lund

The site was grassland allocated for housing. Access depended on Oddfellows Street, part of which was unadopted, lacked street lighting and was agreed to be inadequate for the proposed development without improvement.

An outline scheme of road improvements had been submitted. The claimant offered a unilateral undertaking which would, in effect, cover the full cost and prevent commencement or occupation until the works were complete. He argued that Kirklees Council could deliver the improvements using its private street works powers under sections 205 to 208 of the Highways Act 1980.

The difficulty was the decision to initiate that process. A resolution required member approval, frontage owners had opposed the works during a 2024 consultation, and the highways department had said it would not use the powers unilaterally if those owners refused consent.

The Inspector accepted that the statutory powers existed. His concern was whether they would actually be exercised within the typical three-year permission period. He concluded that there was no prospect of the necessary works being delivered in that time.

Material considerations and third-party opposition

The claimant relied on British Railways Board v Secretary of State for the Environment and Hounslow LBC [1994] JPL 32. He argued that landowner opposition and political reluctance were immaterial to the planning decision.

The judge distinguished an objection to the planning merits from evidence about the practical likelihood of statutory action. The Inspector was not deciding whether the landowners’ views were good reasons to oppose the houses. He was assessing whether the highway authority was likely to resolve to use its powers.

At paragraph 8, the judge said that evidence bearing on the prospects of using highway powers was “plainly material”. The British Railways Board authority did not resolve that different question. Ground 1 disclosed no arguable error.

The Grampian condition policy test

The judgment records the agreed policy test: whether there were no prospects at all of the necessary action being performed within the relevant permission period. See Planning Geek’s guide to planning conditions and the original Grampian Regional Council authority for the wider context.

The claimant said that the Inspector had moved inconsistently from uncertainty about the use of the powers to a conclusion that there was no prospect of delivery. The court rejected that reading. The earlier passages set out the evidence; the later conclusion reflected an evaluation of that evidence.

Read fairly and as a whole, the decision letter was not contradictory. At paragraph 20, the judge described the reasons as “adequate and intelligible”. This was a conclusion about the Inspector’s reasoning on the particular evidence, not a new rule that any uncertainty makes a Grampian condition unacceptable.

Why John Lund’s offer to pay was not enough

The claimant argued that section 208 objections were limited to frontage owners asked to contribute financially. Because he proposed to meet the whole cost, he contended that the other owners would have no relevant basis to object.

The court’s answer was that this later stage depended on an earlier resolution under section 205. The undertaking did not compel the highway authority to initiate the process. It therefore did not remove the practical and political uncertainties the Inspector had identified.

The judgment also records that the local planning authority could not demand that the highway authority exercise its discretionary powers. The fact that both functions sat within Kirklees Council did not remove that distinction.

Limits of John Lund and practical use

A further argument that the council was unlawfully fettering its discretion had not been before the Inspector, was not pleaded and was not the subject of an application to amend the grounds. The judge declined to make findings on it. John Lund should therefore not be cited as a ruling that any refusal to use highway powers in the face of objections is necessarily lawful.

The irrationality and reasons challenges also failed. The Inspector could weigh the council’s wish to explore options against the identified obstacles. The court treated the attempt to revisit that assessment as an attempt to reargue the planning merits.

For applicants, the practical lesson is to separate legal powers, funding and delivery. Evidence of an available power and a promise to pay may leave the central question unanswered: will the body controlling the works actually act within the relevant period?

Useful planning evidence may include the highway authority’s position, the required approval process and a realistic programme. These are practical implications of the judgment, rather than a checklist imposed by the court. Third-party opposition is not an automatic veto, and the absence of control over land does not by itself rule out a Grampian condition.

Read our news report on the John Lund Grampian condition judgment. The approved judgment is available through Find Case Law, with Planning Geek’s protected local copy below for Gold members.