A Brent HMO enforcement appeal has failed over a London property’s mixed use for a house in multiple occupation and short-term letting. The Inspector upheld the council’s notice, removed two unnecessary requirements and awarded Brent part of its appeal costs.
Inspector M Ollerenshaw issued both decisions on 17 November 2026 following a site visit to Walton Close in north-west London. The property had previously been a single dwellinghouse and had an HMO licence, but a later planning permission for HMO use did not resolve the separate short-term letting allegation.
The Brent HMO enforcement decision matters for three reasons. It distinguishes HMO licensing from planning permission, considers who must receive an enforcement notice, and shows how the late withdrawal of an appeal ground can lead to a costs order even where other arguments are considered.
Why the Brent HMO enforcement notice survived
The enforcement notice was issued by the London Borough of Brent on 23 June 2025. It alleged that the house had changed from a Class C3 dwelling into a mixed use comprising an HMO and short-term letting accommodation. Its requirements included ceasing the mixed use and removing equipment and fixtures installed to support it, including door locks, en-suite bathrooms and kitchen facilities within rooms.
The property was licensed in January 2022 as an HMO for no more than five occupants. That licensing decision regulated housing occupation and did not in itself establish that the mixed planning use was lawful. The appellant, Mohammed Nawrozzadeh, did not deny that the accommodation had been used both as an HMO and for short-term lets.
Originally, the appeal relied on grounds (c), (e), (f) and (g) under section 174 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. Ground (c), asserting that the alleged use was not a breach of planning control, was withdrawn in the appellant’s final comments. The Inspector therefore determined only the remaining grounds, rather than making a ruling that the mixed use was lawful.
The Brent HMO enforcement notice was nonetheless corrected. Step 1 required the mixed use to cease, while steps 2 and 3 separately required HMO occupation and short-term letting to cease. Inspector Ollerenshaw found that steps 2 and 3 duplicated the first requirement and deleted them. This improved clarity without changing the central allegation or invalidating the notice.
Were the HMO tenants entitled to separate notice?
Under ground (e), the appellant argued that individual tenants holding separate agreements should have received their own enforcement notices. Without personal service, he said, they had been denied the opportunity to appeal, obtain advice and find somewhere else to live.
Brent had delivered copies to those present at the property, posted copies and displayed a notice conspicuously at the front door. It had also asked for occupiers’ details through a planning contravention notice. The appellant had not provided the names or agreements requested, and did not establish who had missed service or how that person had suffered substantial prejudice.
As the Inspector put it, The appellant has not identified any individual who should have been served with the notice but was not
. Section 176(5) allows a failure of service to be disregarded where neither the appellant nor the affected person has been substantially prejudiced. The ground (e) appeal was dismissed.
The decision also considered Article 8 rights, but the relevant ground concerned the statutory service requirements and prejudice rather than a general right to remain in the property. For similar disputes, evidence identifying affected occupiers, their legal interests, notice received and actual prejudice is more useful than a bare assertion that tenants were overlooked. Planning Geek’s guide to enforcement appeal grounds explains those different statutory tests.
Removal of bathrooms and the later HMO permission
Ground (f) challenged the scale of the remedial works. The appellant accepted that locks and some kitchen equipment would need to be removed but wanted en-suite bathrooms to remain. The Inspector was not given evidence that those bathrooms and kitchens existed before the unauthorised change of use and considered them part of the facilities enabling that use.
On that evidence, the requirement to remove the fixtures was not excessive. The statutory aim of the notice was to restore lawful planning control, not simply to prevent bookings while leaving every feature that supported the mixed use in place. The Brent HMO enforcement appeal therefore failed on ground (f) as well.
There was an important complication. Brent had granted planning permission, reference 26/1865, for HMO use on 15 September 2026, after the enforcement notice was issued. Section 180(1) of the 1990 Act can prevent an enforcement notice taking effect to the extent that it is inconsistent with a later planning permission. The Inspector expressly recognised that protection and did not rewrite the notice to duplicate the approved HMO scheme.
That does not authorise short-term letting or establish that the original mixed use had always been lawful. The detail of the later permission and its approved plans still matters. The Inspector did not determine the lawfulness of separate roof alterations or an extension, as those works were outside the alleged breach. Planning Geek’s lawful HMO guide deals with the different evidence needed to establish planning status, while its serviced accommodation guide explains when short-term occupation may involve a material change of use.
Six months to comply and the limits of Article 8
The appellant also sought twelve months rather than the six months specified by the notice. He referred to ending tenancies, relocating occupants, finding contractors and carrying out the required alterations. The Inspector found insufficient evidence of long tenancies, notice periods or resistance to repossession to justify doubling the compliance period.
Although the occupiers’ home and private-life rights under Article 8 were engaged, the Inspector found the six-month period proportionate to the public-interest planning objective. The Inspector observed, The notice provides a reasonable period for the residents to find an alternative home.
Section 173A(1)(b) also provides a mechanism for a council to extend a compliance period where appropriate. The Brent HMO enforcement appeal therefore failed on ground (g).
Why Brent recovered only part of its costs
The separate costs decision is particularly instructive. Brent sought an award against Mr Nawrozzadeh for unreasonable conduct concerning grounds (c) and (e). The Inspector rejected one of the council’s complaints: a statement of case had in fact been submitted on 30 July 2025, so it was wrong to suggest that the appellant had provided none.
However, ground (c) had been maintained until late in the written appeal process, causing Brent to prepare its response, and was then withdrawn without an explanation or any material change in circumstances. The appellant had also pursued ground (e) without identifying the tenants allegedly deprived of service or providing the information sought through the planning contravention notice. The Inspector found both matters caused unnecessary appeal expense.
The result was a partial costs award, expressly limited to Brent’s expenditure in dealing with grounds (c) and (e). It was not an award covering every aspect of enforcement and it did not specify a fixed sum: the parties are to agree the amount or have it assessed. The Brent HMO enforcement outcome demonstrates why a weak ground and a late withdrawal can carry financial consequences even without an oral hearing.
Our planning appeal costs guide explains why success or failure alone is not the test. The question is whether unreasonable behaviour actually caused unnecessary or wasted expense in the appeal proceedings.
The cited Mayes and Majed decisions need care
Two reported court authorities were raised by the appellant on notice service: Mayes, White and Oubridge v Secretary of State for Wales and Dinefwr Borough Council [1989] JPL 848 and R (Majed) v London Borough of Camden. The Inspector considered the cited decisions but found them insufficiently comparable to the facts concerning service at Walton Close.
There is a citation point worth correcting. The Inspector’s footnote gives Majed as [2009] EWHC 1996 (Admin), but that neutral citation belongs to R (Hope and Glory Public House Ltd) v City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court. The separately reported Majed Court of Appeal judgment is [2009] EWCA Civ 1029 and concerns planning consultation and legitimate expectation. It should not be treated as a direct decision on service of an enforcement notice.
What this means for HMO operators
For property owners, the Brent HMO enforcement decision separates three questions: what use has planning permission, what the enforcement notice actually alleges, and what a later permission authorises to continue. An HMO licence does not answer those questions. Service challenges and requests for more time require evidence about the occupiers and their circumstances, while unsupported appeal grounds can carry a costs risk.
The Brent HMO enforcement appeal is APP/T5150/C/25/3370129. The Planning Inspectorate case record identifies the official appeal. The appeal decision is also available on AppealBase, together with the separate partial costs ruling.

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