An East Devon CIL surcharge has been quashed after a Planning Inspector found that the council had used an unsupported date for the start of development. The case concerned demolition works and a planned new dwelling in Honiton, not a completed house.
Inspector M Madge issued appeal decision APP/U1105/L/25/3369140 on 27th October 2026. East Devon District Council had demanded payment after treating 15th June 2022 as the commencement date. The appellant disputed both the alleged failure to give notice and the date on the demand notice.
The crucial distinction is that work had taken place, but the evidence did not establish that the chargeable phase of development had begun. The CIL surcharge was cancelled. The underlying CIL position was not finally settled, and the Inspector declined to fix a replacement commencement date.
I would treat this as a reminder that a Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) surcharge needs a properly evidenced commencement date. It does not remove the underlying levy or determine what date may ultimately apply.
Why the CIL surcharge was imposed
The dispute arose from planning permission granted on 1st April 2022 for two elements of development: demolition of a garage and workshop, followed by construction of a dwelling at land known as Green Door in Mill Street. A liability notice followed in April 2024 and a demand notice was issued in June 2025.
The collecting authority relied partly on a Google Street View image said to show demolition near the frontage in November 2022. It also cited the appellant’s later statement that demolition had occurred within 12 months of the permission being granted. Neither piece of evidence showed the relevant work beginning precisely on 15th June 2022.
The Inspector therefore rejected the date selected by the council. For practitioners, this is an important reminder that a CIL surcharge should not rest on an assumed commencement date when the evidence cannot substantiate it.
Planning Geek’s CIL surcharge guidance explains the consequences of missing required notices, but whether a notice was due depends on when chargeable development actually commenced.
Demolition and building a home were distinct phases
The planning permission contained an archaeological condition requiring a written scheme of investigation to be approved and implemented before development other than demolition could take place. The site was small enough that the existing buildings had to be removed before that archaeological work and the subsequent new dwelling could proceed.
Applying regulation 8 of the Community Infrastructure Levy Regulations 2010, the Inspector treated the demolition and the residential construction as separate phases. The residential phase could not lawfully begin until the archaeological pre-commencement requirements had been satisfied. There was no evidence that the scheme had been approved or the requisite archaeological work carried out.
That finding is central to the CIL surcharge outcome. Demolition can be a genuine physical operation, but it does not automatically prove that a separate chargeable phase has commenced where a phased permission and an outstanding condition govern the later works. Our CIL commencement guide explains why identifying the relevant trigger matters.
The Inspector also noted that a later proposal showed the site being used for parking and outdoor space associated with a different home. This raised a possible question about whether the original dwelling permission had become spent. It was raised as a possibility, not determined as a definitive loss of permission.
Why the commencement-date challenge was not fully determined
There were two strands to the appeal. Under regulation 118, the appellant challenged the deemed commencement date stated in the demand notice. Under regulation 117(1)(a), the appellant challenged the surcharge for allegedly failing to submit a commencement notice.
On the date issue, Inspector Madge found 15th June 2022 was wrong and said the council should withdraw the demand notice. However, regulation 118 also required the Inspector to identify a revised deemed commencement date after allowing the challenge. No reliable evidence supplied a new date, and the residential phase had not commenced.
The Inspector therefore expressly declined to determine the regulation 118 appeal. That procedural qualification matters. It would be misleading to report that a definitive new date was substituted or that the whole CIL liability was extinguished. A fresh demand notice may become appropriate if the development starts and the relevant legal requirements are met.
Planning Geek’s guide to liability and demand notices distinguishes the notices and their functions. This CIL surcharge decision illustrates why confusing a liability notice, a demand notice and a claimed commencement can lead to an avoidable dispute.
The surcharge itself was quashed
The regulation 117 challenge had a clearer outcome. Regulation 67 requires a commencement notice to be submitted by the day before chargeable development begins. With the chargeable dwelling phase not commenced, the Inspector found no failure to give a notice of its intended commencement.
In the Inspector’s words, there has been no failure to notify the CA of the intended commencement of chargeable development
. The surcharge imposed under regulation 83 could not stand, and the regulation 117(1)(a) appeal was allowed. The order quashed the surcharge, not every potential levy obligation under the original consent.
Anyone facing a CIL surcharge should check the operative permission, pre-commencement conditions, whether a phased consent exists, what works actually occurred and the evidence of their dates. Each case turns on those documents. The CIL appeals guide outlines the separate routes and limits on challenges.
There is no reliable amount stated in the available decision text for either the original demand or the surcharge, so a financial saving cannot responsibly be quoted. Nor should the result be treated as permission to begin a chargeable dwelling phase without meeting outstanding planning conditions.
Official decision and sources
The decision is Planning Inspectorate appeal APP/U1105/L/25/3369140, made by Inspector M Madge on 27th October 2026 concerning East Devon District Council. The short quotation is from the Inspector’s decision and is reproduced under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
The appeal decision is also available on AppealBase. The decision text available at the time of writing does not identify an appellant or a levy amount; none is inferred here.
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