A retrospective CIL appeal in Richmond upon Thames has failed after an appointed person found that a council had correctly treated development as starting on the day it granted retrospective planning permission. The owner had argued that works began several years earlier, but the Community Infrastructure Levy rules provide a different deemed commencement date for this type of permission.
Ken McEntee dismissed appeal APP/L5810/L/25/3374521 on 19 November 2026. The dispute concerned a demand notice issued after permission granted on 18 June 2025 for development at Park Road, Hampton Hill. The council had entered that same date as the deemed commencement date, rather than the earlier date when building work was said to have started.
The retrospective CIL appeal illustrates why a developer can be right about the date physical work began yet still lose a challenge to the levy commencement date. The specific statutory rule, not the chronology of the works alone, determined the outcome. It also makes an instructive comparison with a separate Croydon commencement appeal decided earlier in November.
Why the retrospective CIL appeal failed
The appointed person was deciding a challenge under Regulation 118 of the Community Infrastructure Levy Regulations 2010. That is a narrow appeal route. The question was whether the collecting authority had inserted the wrong deemed commencement date in its demand notice. It was not an open appeal against every part of the council’s treatment of the development.
According to the decision, planning permission was first granted on 27 May 2021 for an extension. The appellant maintained that works began in July 2022, but the council subsequently found that the building had been demolished and rebuilt instead of extended in accordance with the approved scheme.
The council told the owner that a retrospective application should be submitted to regularise the unauthorised works, otherwise it would need to consider whether enforcement action would be expedient. An application followed in February 2023. Retrospective permission was eventually granted on 18 June 2025 under section 73A of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990.
A default liability notice was served on 19 August 2025 and a demand notice on 3 October 2025. The latter specified 18 June 2025 as the deemed commencement date. The retrospective CIL appeal challenged that date, with the appellant relying on the much earlier start of works under the previous permission.
Why retrospective permission changes the date
The crucial distinction is between Regulation 7(2) and Regulation 7(5)(a). Under the ordinary rule in Regulation 7(2), development generally commences when the first material operation begins on the relevant land. But Regulation 7(3) makes that rule subject to specified exceptions.
Regulation 7(5)(a) addresses development that has already been carried out and is then granted planning permission under section 73A. For that situation, the deemed commencement date is the date the retrospective permission is granted or modified. The earlier physical start of the building work is not substituted for the statutory date.
Mr McEntee wrote that in such cases development is treated as “commencing on the day planning permission for that development is granted or modified”. His determination was that the council had used 18 June 2025 correctly. That is why the retrospective CIL appeal was dismissed, notwithstanding the appellant’s assertion that works had started in July 2022.
This matters because a retrospective application is not simply a delayed version of an ordinary prospective permission. Its effect within the levy regulations has to be considered separately, including when the authority can treat development as having begun for CIL purposes.
The earlier planning permission did not determine CIL commencement
The decision also explains why the appellant’s reliance on the 2021 permission did not resolve the point. The earlier consent authorised an extension. The development actually carried out was treated by the council as demolition and rebuilding, requiring a different, retrospective permission. The Regulation 118 appeal had to be resolved by reference to the permission relevant to the demand notice.
It was not necessary for the appointed person to determine every dispute about the council’s correspondence or how long the retrospective application took. Mr McEntee observed that it was unclear why determination had taken more than two years, but that delay was outside the ground of appeal he had jurisdiction to consider.
Anyone disputing procedural conduct therefore needs to identify the appropriate remedy. A complaint about the authority’s handling of a case does not, by itself, prove that the commencement date in a CIL demand notice is legally wrong. That is a separate issue from the statutory calculation.
Planning Geek’s guidance on CIL commencement explains how material operations and deemed dates differ. The liability notice and demand notice guide also sets out the purpose of each notice and the importance of checking the precise basis of the demand.
How this differs from the Croydon commencement appeal
The result is especially worth reading alongside the Croydon CIL commencement date appeal reported earlier this month. That separate case succeeded because the authority had selected the wrong deemed date after a retrospective permission. Here, the same statutory principle led to the opposite outcome because the date inserted in the Richmond demand notice matched the grant date.
Those contrasting outcomes reinforce the practical lesson. Retrospective permission does not automatically make a CIL demand notice invalid, and nor does it automatically defeat every commencement challenge. The question is whether the authority has applied the correct regulation to the correct planning permission and used the resulting date.
The retrospective CIL appeal also highlights the limits of the appointed person’s role. A challenge to a commencement date is not the same as a review of the chargeable amount, a surcharge appeal or a complaint about administration. Different CIL disputes have different statutory routes and time limits, which should be checked before choosing an argument.
For readers facing similar demands, it is worth examining the planning history, the exact scope and date of any section 73A permission, and the demand notice together. A timeline of building operations may still be useful evidence, but it cannot override a specific statutory deemed commencement rule. Planning Geek’s CIL appeals guide explains the separate routes.
The decision and practical implications
The Regulation 118 appeal was dismissed. That determination concerns the deemed commencement date in the demand notice, not a broader ruling on the merits of the development or the council’s conduct. It should not be read as deciding questions the appointed person explicitly treated as outside the appeal.
The appeal decision is also available on AppealBase. The underlying Planning Inspectorate appeal record is the primary official case reference. The retrospective CIL appeal is a timely reminder to distinguish the physical commencement of works from the legal deemed date used in a particular levy notice.



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