Rodmersham solar farm survives High Court challenge

A High Court challenge to a solar farm on 65 hectares of agricultural land at Pitstock Farm in Rodmersham, Kent, has failed. The court rejected all four grounds advanced by Rodmersham Parish Council, leaving Swale Borough Council’s planning permission intact.

The judgment in R (Rodmersham Parish Council) v Swale Borough Council [2026] EWHC 2381 (Admin), handed down on 16th September 2026, contains a particularly useful lesson about late planning obligations. A document appearing seven minutes before committee was only part of the story.

What Swale approved for the solar farm

The development comprises ground-mounted solar panels, substations, a control house and associated infrastructure. The committee report reproduced in the judgment records a generation figure of 41 MW.

Swale’s planning committee resolved to approve the application on 11th September 2025, subject to completion of a planning obligation. The vote was tied, with six members on each side and two abstentions, before the chair used his casting vote in favour.

Permission was issued on 3rd October 2025. Its temporary period runs for 40 years from the first export of energy, although the substation and its ancillary infrastructure may remain permanently.

The seven-minute upload and the 22-day opportunity

The parish council received notification of a draft unilateral undertaking at 6.53 pm on 11th September 2025. The committee meeting began at 7 pm, with the solar farm the first application on the agenda.

The section 106 planning obligation addressed public rights of way contributions and a skylark mitigation strategy. The parish council argued that such late publication prevented meaningful scrutiny before councillors decided whether to approve the scheme.

However, the process continued after committee. The developer executed the final undertaking on 17th September 2025, the council published the executed document on 30th September 2025, and permission followed on 3rd October 2025. The judgment also records two subsequent drafts being uploaded between the first draft and the grant.

Under Article 40 of the Development Management Procedure Order, proposed and completed planning obligations must appear on the planning register. The relevant wording concerns applications that have not been “finally disposed of”.

The judge held that the conditional committee resolution did not finally dispose of this application. Permission had still to be granted, and the council could reconsider its resolution before that happened.

The relevant opportunity was therefore the 22 days between publication of the first draft and the issue of permission. The court considered that ample time to examine this relatively short undertaking and make representations about its contents.

The parish council’s barrister complained during that period about the publication process, but did not raise substantive criticisms of the undertaking. The court found that there had been a real opportunity to do so.

This was not a general seven-minute rule

The judge accepted that seven minutes was insufficient to read and digest the undertaking fully. He expressly left open whether that period alone would have satisfied the law, because the relevant opportunity here lasted 22 days.

He also rejected the idea that publication at any moment before permission must be sufficient. Adequate time depends on the circumstances, including a document’s complexity, the need for specialist advice and how quickly that advice can reasonably be obtained.

The judgment distinguished Greenfields, where no proposed or completed section 106 agreement had been published before permission was granted. It did not remove the need for meaningful public access to planning obligations.

Publication and consultation are separate questions

Following Greenfields, the court explained that Article 40 is a duty to include information on a public register. Its purpose includes enabling people to understand and comment on a planning obligation, but it is not itself a statutory duty to consult.

That distinction does not decide whether separate reconsultation requirements, procedural fairness or a legitimate expectation require further consultation in another case. Those questions still need to be considered on their own facts.

Why the EIA screening challenge failed

Swale had concluded on 15th November 2023 that an environmental impact assessment was not required. The parish council argued that later amendments and other material required that conclusion to be revisited.

The changes included lower panels, revised positioning and access, additional hedgerow screening and further heritage assessment. The objections also raised possible cumulative effects involving the Highsted Park housing proposals.

The court found that the officer had considered the changes and environmental effects properly. Read fairly as a whole, the report asked the right question about whether the earlier negative EIA screening opinion remained valid.

The Highsted schemes were still awaiting determination when permission was granted, and the judge accepted their treatment on these facts as uncommitted proposals. This is not a blanket rule excluding pending applications from cumulative assessment.

The underlying requirement remains that permission must not be granted for EIA development without an EIA. A previous negative opinion does not remove the need to consider relevant subsequent changes, but a fresh formal screening exercise is not automatically necessary where those changes have been properly considered.

Councillors could disagree with the recommendation

The parish council also challenged the chair’s comments that refusal required substantial reasons and that members should expect to help defend a refusal at appeal.

The court read those remarks in the context of the debate and member training. It understood the reference to substantial reasons as requiring evidence-based planning reasons, and the expectation of appeal assistance as distinct from compulsion.

No evidence showed that members voting in favour had been misled. The close vote did not itself establish unlawful advice. Councillors remained entitled to disagree with officers on legitimate planning grounds.

A grid connection target was not an earliest possible date

The final ground alleged a failure to make reasonable enquiries under the Tameside duty. The parish council argued that generation could not begin before 2036, delaying the renewable energy benefits and extending the site’s overall involvement beyond 40 years.

The evidence described 31st October 2036 as a target energisation date, not an absolute earliest connection date. The developer had requested an earlier connection on 30th October 2028, although that request was not a guarantee.

The officer report recorded a connection agreement without promising immediate generation. The court found that further enquiry was not legally required on these facts. The Tameside duty requires reasonable information gathering, rather than every enquiry that might be useful.

The practical lesson

All four substantive grounds failed. The court granted permission for grounds two to four to proceed before dismissing them, alongside ground one. The published judgment leaves the consequential order to be agreed or addressed through further submissions, rather than recording a final costs award.

For Planning Geek, the clearest lesson is to keep reviewing important documents between a committee resolution and the issue of permission. Anyone concerned about a late obligation should explain its actual deficiencies promptly. The judgment shows why that opportunity can still matter, while leaving councils responsible for providing a meaningful chance to examine the document.

Our Rodmersham v Swale case-law summary explains the judgment in more detail and links to the locally held judgment.

Created: 17th September 2026