A Thurrock enforcement notice has been quashed after an Inspector found that its allegation, reasons and demands did not adequately describe the same alleged breach. The decision, issued on 17 November 2026, concerned land beside Ponds Farm on Purfleet Road, where the council had sought to stop open storage and require the removal of materials and hard surfacing.
Inspector M Bale concluded that some of the errors could have been corrected without unfairness, but the overall uncertainty could not. The appeal was therefore resolved without determining whether the storage use was lawful or whether retrospective planning permission should be granted.
The Thurrock enforcement notice decision is a reminder that the legal wording of an enforcement notice is as important as the planning issue behind it. A council must identify what it alleges has happened and tell recipients clearly what they are required to do. A broad instruction cannot safely be assumed to cover a completely different collection of items.
What the Thurrock enforcement notice alleged
Thurrock Borough Council issued its notice on 1 April 2026 against land beside Ponds Farm in Essex. The allegation described the stationing of lorry parts, open storage of building materials, the creation of hard surfacing and the open storage of metal fencing and wood. The appellant, Marin Matija, challenged the notice under section 174 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990.
The specified steps went further in some respects and were narrower in others. They required the cessation of open storage and removal of building materials, metal fencing, plastic cable, vehicle parts, waste and hard surfacing, followed by restoration of the land. Yet the allegation did not expressly mention plastic cable or waste, while wood was not expressly included in the removal requirements.
The council’s reasons introduced caravans, large shipping containers and parked or stored motor vehicles, none of which was identified consistently in the operative allegation and requirements. This was not simply a spelling error. It left uncertainty about whether the council was pursuing a general storage use or a series of particular activities involving specified objects.
An enforcement notice must tell its recipient with reasonable certainty what has to stop and what needs to be restored. That matters for the grounds of appeal, the evidence the recipient must assemble and the risk of enforcement action if the notice ultimately takes effect.
The immediate compliance instruction was defective
The Thurrock enforcement notice required the land’s open storage use to cease “forthwith”, with the period described as beginning from the date the notice took effect. The remaining removal and restoration steps carried a two-month period. Inspector Bale considered this a defect because the first instruction did not specify a compliance period in the way required by section 173(9) of the 1990 Act.
The Inspector did not treat that problem alone as fatal to the whole document. Read together with the subsequent restoration steps, the notice contained enough of a timetable to avoid being a nullity. Moving the cessation requirement into the two-month compliance period would have been a correction that caused no injustice, in the Inspector’s assessment.
That distinction is particularly useful. A defective enforcement notice is not automatically incapable of repair. Inspectors have statutory powers to correct or vary some errors, provided doing so would not cause injustice. But those powers do not permit a notice to be rewritten in a way that unfairly changes the case either party has to meet.
Why the conflicting descriptions could not be repaired
The more serious difficulty was the mismatch between the alleged breach, the reasons given for issuing the notice and the specified remedial steps. A blanket demand to stop open storage could extend to objects not clearly identified in the allegation. Conversely, limiting the notice to the particular listed items might fail to remedy what the council had intended to address.
The uncertainty was compounded by the hard surfacing. The notice was headed as a material change of use, but did not explain clearly whether the surfacing was part of that use or a separate operational development. These are not necessarily the same planning breach and can require different evidence and enforcement analysis.
Inspector Bale considered whether the notice could simply be corrected to describe a change of use to storage. That might have caught containers and caravans mentioned in the reasons but not squarely within the allegation, thereby expanding the appellant’s case. Reducing the notice to the narrower set of specified items might, on the other hand, prejudice the council. The council’s evidence did not establish which outcome it actually intended.
The Inspector therefore concluded that “it is not open to me to correct the errors” using section 176(1)(a), because doing so would cause injustice. The Thurrock enforcement notice was declared invalid and quashed. This is a procedural outcome about the document, not an endorsement of all the activities taking place on the land.
What the ruling does and does not decide
The appellant had advanced grounds (a), (d), (f) and (g). They concerned, respectively, deemed planning permission, the enforcement time limit, excessive requirements and the period allowed for compliance. Because the Thurrock enforcement notice was quashed as invalid, the Inspector did not determine those grounds or the deemed planning application.
That point is vital for landowners and councils alike. The decision does not say that a storage operation at Ponds Farm was lawful, nor that all materials could remain permanently. It says that this particular notice failed to describe and remedy its alleged breach with the necessary clarity. Any further council action would need its own proper statutory and evidential basis.
In a separate costs decision issued the same day, Inspector Bale made a full award of costs against Thurrock Borough Council. The Inspector found that the council had failed to engage in the appeal, had not supplied a properly completed questionnaire or any substantive defence of the notice, and had behaved wholly unreasonably, causing the appellant unnecessary expense. The amount is to be agreed between the parties or, failing agreement, assessed in the Senior Courts Costs Office.
Planning Geek’s guide to enforcement appeal grounds sets out how the different challenges work. Where multiple activities, structures or uses are involved, it is particularly important to check whether the allegation and remedial requirements are aimed at the same breach.
Why precision matters before a notice is served
For an authority, the Thurrock enforcement notice shows the risks of adding a catalogue of site complaints to the reasons without aligning them precisely with the alleged development and the steps required. Photographs, a chronology, a clear description of the planning unit and carefully distinguished operational works and uses can help avoid an uncertain allegation.
For recipients, the first job is to compare the three parts of a notice: what it says happened, why action is considered expedient and exactly what it demands. The deadline to appeal still matters. Apparent ambiguity should not be treated as a reason to ignore a notice or assume that every drafting defect will result in it being quashed.
Inspector M Bale’s decision on appeal 6008833, dated 17 November 2026, concerns a notice served by Thurrock Borough Council on 1 April 2026. The decision is published on the Planning Inspectorate appeal page. The appeal decision is also available on AppealBase. It demonstrates the limit of an Inspector’s correction power when the intended breach and the required remedy are insufficiently certain.

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