A Thurrock enforcement notice covering a caravan, commercial skips and delivery vehicles has been quashed because its allegations did not clearly identify the alleged breach of planning control. Inspector Chris Preston ruled on 9 November 2026 that the defects could not be corrected without causing injustice.
The notice concerned land south of the allotments adjoining Heath Road in Chadwell St Mary, Essex. Thurrock Borough Council issued it on 27 January 2025, requiring removal of the caravan, skips and commercial vehicles and cessation of the alleged uses within one month of the notice taking effect.
The Thurrock enforcement notice is an important reminder that an authority must identify precisely what development it says has occurred. An Inspector cannot properly decide whether planning permission should be granted on appeal when it is unclear whether the council alleges one mixed use, several separate planning units or mere storage.
Why the Thurrock enforcement notice was invalid
The appellant, Mr Ernie Levi Coates, challenged the notice under section 174(2)(a) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. That ground asks for planning permission for the matters alleged in the notice. Before reaching the merits, however, an Inspector must assess whether the notice itself adequately specifies the alleged breach and whether any drafting defect can be corrected without injustice.
The alleged breaches combined siting a caravan, changing the land to a caravan site, storing commercial skips and storing vehicles associated with skip deliveries. The Inspector found the wording did not allege a material change of use, even though section 55(1) requires a change of use to be material before it constitutes development. Nor did the notice explain the land’s former use.
More fundamentally, it was unclear whether the authority meant to allege one mixed-use planning unit or several distinct uses on separate units. That distinction is not merely a technicality. It determines the precise development for which an application is deemed to have been made and the evidence against which it should be judged.
The Thurrock enforcement notice therefore left the Inspector unable to identify the allegation sufficiently to determine the appeal. The drafting could not simply be treated as a harmless imprecision in the description of activities.
Caravan storage is not necessarily a caravan site
At the unaccompanied site visit on 4 November, the Inspector saw a touring caravan. No skips or other vehicles were present, and part of the land was used to keep a couple of goats with a small shelter. The visit was not a determination of every historical use of the land, but it underlined the need for an intelligible allegation.
The appellant said the caravan was stored, not lived in. The notice nevertheless referred separately to the siting of a caravan and to use as a caravan site. Its reasons said nothing about anyone living in the caravan. In that context, the Inspector explained that simply storing a caravan does not itself amount to using land as a caravan site.
The Thurrock enforcement notice demonstrates why a council should identify whether residential occupation, storage, mixed commercial use or some combination is alleged. These activities can present different planning questions even where the same vehicles or structures are physically present.
Planning Geek’s caravan planning guidance examines when siting or using a caravan creates a planning issue. The facts of this appeal should not be taken as a general immunity for caravan storage, residential use or commercial activity.
Council supplied no evidence to explain the allegations
The Inspector recorded an unusual evidential gap. After concerns were raised about the clarity of the notice, the parties were invited to comment on whether its wording could be corrected without injustice. Neither replied. Thurrock also failed to provide an appeal questionnaire, appeal statement or delegated officer report describing the investigations that led to the notice. The Inspector observed that the Council has provided no information at all
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Without that material, Inspector Preston could not determine the nature of the supposed breach. The statutory power to correct a notice under section 176(1)(a) did not allow the Inspector to reconstruct a case that the issuing authority had not explained. In the Inspector’s words, proceeding on the existing wording would cause clear injustice
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The Thurrock enforcement notice was therefore declared invalid and quashed. The Inspector did not determine the deemed planning application under section 177(5) or grant planning permission for any caravan, skip or vehicle use. That distinction matters: success because a notice is defective is not proof that the underlying activity is lawful.
The council’s failure to participate was significant, but the legal outcome rested on the uncertain allegation and the inability to correct it fairly. It would be too broad to claim that every council omission or failure to return a questionnaire automatically invalidates an enforcement notice.
What authorities and landowners can learn
A well-drafted notice should identify the land, the actual material change of use or operational development alleged, and sufficiently clear requirements to remedy it. Where different activities may occupy separate planning units, the authority should investigate and describe that distinction instead of relying on a bundle of overlapping descriptions.
For recipients, the Thurrock enforcement notice shows why the initial allegation should be checked before arguing the planning merits. If the words do not describe a legally intelligible breach, it may be necessary to raise validity and prejudice as preliminary issues. However, a successful challenge to one notice does not guarantee that future enforcement action is impossible.
Our guide to enforcement appeal grounds explains the separate grounds available and the evidence they require. The relevant statutory provisions include section 173 on enforcement notices and section 176 on an Inspector’s power to correct a notice, alongside sections 55, 172, 174 and 177 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990.
The appeal is APP/M1595/C/25/3361003, decided on 9 November 2026. The appeal decision is also available on AppealBase.


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