A Wanstead enforcement appeal has succeeded after a Planning Inspector found that Redbridge Council wrongly treated several separate businesses and a home in one building as a single mixed planning use. Inspector David Jones quashed the enforcement notice on 16 November 2026, finding that the legal description of the alleged breach could not be corrected without injustice.
The notice, issued in April 2025, sought to stop a car and van hire operation, a takeaway business and office use at premises on Wanstead Park Road, Ilford, and to restore the land to Class F2 community use. But the Inspector found separate shop units, a community use, offices and a residential dwelling, rather than one combined planning unit.
The Wanstead enforcement appeal illustrates a fundamental point often missed in planning enforcement: a common building or ownership does not automatically mean that all its occupiers form one planning unit. Redbridge also failed to attend the agreed site visit, although the notice was quashed because its allegation was legally defective, not simply because an officer was absent.
Wanstead enforcement appeal: what the Council alleged
The enforcement notice was issued by the London Borough of Redbridge on 30 April 2025. It alleged an unauthorised part change of use from Class F2 to a mixed sui generis and Class E use, including car or van hire, a takeaway and offices. The requirements included stopping those uses, removing related equipment and fittings, reinstating community use and clearing debris.
The notice covered the whole building within its red-line plan and specified a three-month compliance period. Two separate parties appealed under section 174 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. Appeal A was brought by Mr Zulfiqar Caan, associated with Dexters SD Ltd; appeal B was brought by Mr Habib Iqbal Mundrawala, associated with Biryani Guys.
The appeals were considered together because they challenged the same notice. The appellants put forward grounds (b), (c), (e), (f) and (g), dealing with whether the alleged breach occurred, whether it constituted a breach of planning control, service of the notice, the required remedial steps and time for compliance. None of those grounds ultimately needed determination after the Inspector found the notice invalid.
The building did not contain one mixed planning unit
Inspector Jones was concerned that the wording used by the Council did not describe what was actually happening. Even as a starting point, he said that “part change of use” should have been framed as a material change of use if it was to constitute development under section 55(1) of the 1990 Act.
More importantly, a mixed use is the single use of an identifiable planning unit incorporating more than one activity. If the whole red-line site really had one mixed use, the notice would need to set out all its components, not isolate only the activities the Council wished to stop. The notice omitted the existing community use and residential dwelling.
The Wanstead enforcement appeal turned on what the Inspector saw at the site. Car and van hire occupied a physically separate part of the southern end of the building. An apparent takeaway was at the northern end, while a community use, upstairs offices and a residential dwelling occupied other sections. Separate front entrances served the different premises, with an internal staircase providing access to the first-floor offices.
The Inspector found that the activities were physically and functionally separate, even if they were within a building under common ownership. In his words, “each use constitutes a primary use each in its own planning unit”. That meant Redbridge had not identified an existing mixed use at all. It had described distinct uses of separate areas as though they formed one composite planning use.
This is exactly the distinction discussed in Planning Geek’s guide to planning units. Whether separate rooms, buildings or areas of land form one planning unit is a question of fact and degree, taking account of occupation, physical separation and functional relationship. An ownership boundary or one address is not necessarily decisive.
Why correcting the notice would have caused injustice
Section 176(1)(a) of the 1990 Act permits an Inspector to correct a defect, error or misdescription in an enforcement notice where doing so would not cause injustice to the parties. That power can save a notice containing a limited drafting mistake, but it does not permit an allegation to be transformed into an entirely different planning breach without proper opportunity to respond.
Inspector Jones considered whether he could revise the notice to address each distinct use separately. That would have required new allegations relating to different planning units, potentially different enforcement time limits and further changes to the red-line plan. Each use might also give rise to a different defence or a different case for granting planning permission.
For example, he referred to an earlier planning application for the change from office to a vehicle-rental booking office, but could not identify a corresponding application for the takeaway. The merits and planning history of those activities were not necessarily the same. A fresh allegation might also prompt one of the appellants to appeal on ground (a), a ground not advanced in the original case.
The Wanstead enforcement appeal therefore went beyond a defective phrase that could be substituted without consequence. The Inspector concluded that the correction would expose the appellants to new allegations they had not been able to challenge. Since that would cause injustice, the statutory correction power could not save the notice.
Our guide to enforcement notices and appeals explains why the alleged breach, the land identified and the remedial steps must be sufficiently clear. The purpose is not just tidy drafting. Those details determine the grounds of appeal available and the evidence a person needs to defend their position.
The missed site visit did not decide the appeal
There was also an unusual procedural episode. Redbridge did not attend the prearranged site visit at the appointed time. Inspector Jones proceeded with the access-required inspection and recorded the Council’s absence in the decision letter.
That absence was not stated to be the legal reason for quashing the notice. The decisive finding came from the separate physical and functional uses observed on the site and the resulting misdescription of the alleged breach. The Inspector considered the terms of the notice and the limits of his correction power, rather than imposing a penalty for the Council’s failure to attend.
The Wanstead enforcement appeal shows how a site inspection can establish a critical fact about planning units. It also illustrates why enforcement action based on the assumption of a single mixed use can be vulnerable where several independently occupied and operated premises share a building.
What happens after the notice was quashed?
Both appeals succeeded in the sense that the single enforcement notice was quashed as invalid. The Inspector did not go on to determine whether any individual business use was lawful, whether a particular planning permission should be granted, or whether the businesses caused harm. The original alleged breach was wrong, so the remaining appeal grounds did not arise.
Crucially, quashing the notice did not grant planning permission to the car-hire, takeaway or office operations. Nor did it confer a lawful development certificate on any of the premises. Their planning status would need to be considered separately against the correct planning history and any applicable development rights or enforcement time limits.
Inspector Jones expressly left open the possibility of fresh, correctly formulated enforcement notices under section 171B(4) of the 1990 Act, should Redbridge decide that further action was appropriate. Such notices would need to identify the particular planning units and alleged breaches accurately, and would carry their own legal and procedural requirements.
For the Council and other enforcement teams, the Wanstead enforcement appeal is a reminder to establish the planning unit before drafting a notice. For occupiers, it shows why challenging the factual description of a breach may be more fundamental than disputing the required steps. A single building can contain several distinct planning units, with separate histories and different legal arguments.
Inspector David Jones issued the linked decisions APP/W5780/C/25/3365810 and APP/W5780/C/25/3365811 on 16 November 2026, both available on the Planning Inspectorate’s appeals casework portal. The full decision is also available on AppealBase.

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