A CIL surcharge appeal has failed in Reading after an Inspector upheld penalties for a late commencement notice, despite finding that the original liability notice had not included the council’s full instalment policy. The decision, issued on 17 November 2026, also examined what happens when work begins on an extension permission before the house is subsequently demolished.
The appeal concerned a residential property in Caversham and a Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) demand issued by Reading Borough Council in June 2025. Inspector M Madge rejected three grounds of challenge relating to the surcharge, the contents of the liability notice and the date that development began.
The CIL surcharge appeal offers a useful warning for householders and developers. Starting work, submitting statutory forms and discharging pre-commencement conditions are distinct steps. A later change in the building project does not automatically undo the consequences of an earlier commencement or dispose of a demand notice.
Why the CIL demand was challenged
The liability notice was served on 12 May 2025. The council subsequently issued a demand notice on 19 June 2025, including a surcharge for failure to submit a commencement notice and late-payment interest. The intended or deemed commencement date was recorded as 2 June 2025. The published decision leaves the chargeable amount and surcharge figures unspecified in its introductory details, so the ruling turns on statutory requirements and timing rather than any reported sum.
The appellant challenged the demand under regulations 117(1)(a), 117(1)(b) and 118 of the Community Infrastructure Levy Regulations 2010. Those provisions concern a surcharge, the content or service of a liability notice and the collecting authority’s determination of a commencement date. They do not turn the appeal into a general reconsideration of whether the building project would have been desirable.
Under regulation 67(1), a commencement notice must ordinarily reach the collecting authority no later than the day before the chargeable development is commenced. The appellant emailed the council a commencement notice on 26 June 2025, but the form itself said development had already started on 2 June. That was more than three weeks after the declared start.
Why the CIL surcharge appeal failed
The CIL surcharge appeal therefore failed on the first ground. The critical point was not whether the paperwork was eventually supplied or whether the operator had intended to comply. It was that the statutory notification had arrived after the commencement date expressly stated on the appellant’s own form.
The liability notice set out that 50% of the levy was payable 60 days after commencement and the other 50% after 120 days. It also explained the consequences of failing to submit a commencement notice, including a surcharge and the loss of instalment rights and reliefs or exemptions.
However, the Inspector found that a copy of the council’s current instalment policy had not been enclosed, with no evidence that it had been sent separately. Regulation 65(2)(da) specifies information about an instalment policy where payment by instalments is available. The liability notice therefore lacked a document that the regulations require it to include where instalments are available.
The CIL surcharge appeal nonetheless failed on the liability-notice ground. Inspector Madge considered that the actual instalment amounts, dates and warnings had been sufficiently explained. The decision states: The recipient has not therefore been prejudiced by the CA’s instalment policy being omitted from the LN.
The finding was fact-sensitive and should not be read as permission for councils generally to omit prescribed documents.
Pre-commencement conditions and the date of work
The third dispute involved the development’s commencement. Planning permission granted in September 2024 covered front, side and rear extensions, a front porch and a part first-floor extension. Two conditions required the council’s approval of additional matters before development could begin, including matters relevant to protected species and the historic environment.
The Inspector treated those as genuine pre-commencement conditions. The council had approved the relevant details by letters dated 29 and 30 May 2025, allowing a lawful start from the latter date. That timing mattered because building operations undertaken before the conditions were discharged might not have amounted to development authorised by the original permission.
The council produced photographs of building works, including removal of the pitched roof and part of the front wall. Inspector Madge considered those operations sufficient to show that the authorised development had begun under section 56(4) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 and the relevant CIL provisions. The appellant’s own commencement notice supported the 2 June 2025 start.
That was enough to defeat the regulation 118 challenge. The CIL surcharge appeal did not require the Inspector to speculate about a wholly different start date in the absence of evidence. The Inspector instead weighed the documented approvals, the visible operations and the appellant’s admitted date.
Demolition does not turn an extension into a new house
There was a further complication. The council later considered that the original extension permission could no longer be implemented because the main dwelling had been demolished. A replacement dwelling requires a different analysis from extensions to an existing house, and the Inspector understood that a further planning permission had since been granted.
This is where section 73 becomes important. Section 73 permits a further permission for essentially the same development without complying with one or more original conditions. It does not transform an extension permission into authorisation for a newly built replacement house after the original building has disappeared.
In the CIL surcharge appeal, the Inspector expressly regarded section 73 as inapplicable to the proposed replacement dwelling. That conclusion was about the limits of the relevant planning permission, rather than a ruling that every later replacement project will necessarily attract a particular levy. Planning Geek’s CIL and section 73 guidance explains how amended permissions and levy liabilities should be considered separately.
The Inspector also acknowledged an awkward consequence. There would be no new development arising from the earlier extension permission once it was no longer implementable. But the question of whether CIL should continue to be collected in those circumstances was left to the collecting authority, not determined as part of this appeal.
That distinction deserves attention. A successful argument that a later scheme needs fresh planning permission is not necessarily a successful challenge to a historic surcharge or to the administrative steps taken under the original permission. Each demand, exemption, liability notice and commencement notice must be checked against its own statutory route and dates.
What applicants should check before starting
For applicants, the practical starting point is to establish which permission is being implemented and whether every condition that must be discharged before commencement has been satisfied. The council’s written approvals, contractor start instructions and dates of actual building operations should be kept together. Do not assume that a builder’s first site activity is legally irrelevant or automatically amounts to a lawful commencement.
There is also a simple administrative lesson. The CIL surcharge appeal shows the danger of sending a commencement notice after work has begun. Planning Geek’s guide to CIL surcharges, interest and missed forms covers the consequences of missed notices and why the sequence matters. Developers should verify the precise forms and exemptions required before any material operation starts.
Decision and documents
The decision is appeal APP/E0345/L/25/3370245, made by Inspector M Madge on 17 November 2026 following a site visit on 13 August 2026. The council was Reading Borough Council. All three grounds advanced under regulations 117 and 118 were dismissed. The decision also contains an apparent inconsistency in the year stated for the deemed commencement date in one paragraph, so the underlying demand notice should be checked before relying on that isolated reference.
The Planning Inspectorate appeal record provides the official case reference. The appeal decision is also available on AppealBase. The wider lesson is not that every missing enclosure is harmless, but that the Inspector’s decision depended on what information was actually supplied, whether prejudice had arisen and what the evidence established about commencement.

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