A Class L argument has failed at 81 Ashness Gardens in Greenford after an Inspector was not persuaded that a permitted conversion to two flats had ever genuinely been implemented before the property became two HMOs.
The important lesson is evidential. The Inspector did not say that a short-lived intermediate use can never count. Instead, the problem was whether the claimed two-flat use had happened at all.
The enforcement notice alleged two small HMOs
The appeal concerned 81 Ashness Gardens, Greenford UB6 0RW. Ealing issued an enforcement notice on 16th April 2025 alleging a material change of use of the premises to two small Houses in Multiple Occupation, facilitated by a rear and side extension, changes to the former garage opening and alterations to the roof.
The owner, Manorlands Estates Ltd, appealed under grounds (a), (b), (c), (f) and (g). Inspector M Ollerenshaw dismissed appeal APP/A5270/C/25/3365332 on 4th September 2026, upheld the notice and refused planning permission on the deemed application.
Planning Geek’s guide to enforcement appeal grounds explains the very different questions raised by grounds (b), (c), (f) and (g).
The claimed route depended on two flats existing first
The property had originally been a single dwellinghouse. In February 2024, permission 234877FUL was granted for conversion to two self-contained flats together with extensions and roof alterations.
The appellant’s case was essentially this:
- The 2024 permission was implemented and the building genuinely became two self-contained flats
- Each flat then changed from Class C3 to Class C4 under the permitted development right in Class L
- The resulting two small HMOs were therefore lawful or permitted development
If that factual sequence had been established, it would have raised an important Class L question. But the Inspector found that the evidence did not prove the intermediate two-flat stage.
Party-wall drawings pointed to an HMO layout almost from the start
The appellant said building work began on 8th April 2024. Yet drawings for a party-wall agreement signed only days later, on 19th April 2024, already depicted a ten-room HMO-style layout.
The layout eventually found at the property broadly corresponded with those drawings and differed materially from the approved two-flat plans.
The appellant said the party-wall drawings were intended to demonstrate the possible potential of the building and that the contractor had actually been instructed to build the approved two flats first. The Inspector found that explanation unpersuasive because the drawings were attached to a party-wall agreement and expressly accepted as depicting the works to be undertaken.
A July 2024 email from Ealing’s enforcement team had said that the works then appeared broadly in accordance with the approved plans. But the Inspector noted that construction was still under way at that point. The email did not prove that the approved flat layout was later completed and brought into use.
Tenancy agreements showed a right to occupy, not proof of occupation
The appellant relied on tenancy agreements said to begin on 4 and 5th October 2024, together with deeds of surrender dated 30th November 2024. On paper, they supported the proposition that two separate households had a legal right to occupy the flats for a period.
But that was not the same as proving the approved flat layout had physically existed or that the property was actually occupied as two self-contained flats.
The Inspector had not been given rent receipts, bank statements, council tax records, utility accounts or evidence from the purported tenants confirming occupation. Electrical installation reports and other certification showed that works had been carried out and tested, but did not establish that the approved two-flat scheme was first completed and used.
That distinction is particularly important in a lawfulness case, where the appellant carries the evidential burden and the question is decided on the balance of probabilities.
Two months of occupation was not automatically too short
Ealing argued that, even if the flats had been occupied, little more than two months would not amount to a genuine use.
The Inspector did not accept that as a general rule. She said a period of that length could, in principle, be capable of establishing a use as self-contained flats.
That is an important nuance. The failure was not caused by a minimum period of occupation. The Inspector’s concern was the lack of persuasive evidence that occupation as two flats had occurred at all.
The decision referred to Impey and Welwyn Hatfield when considering when a material change of use is brought into being. Actual occupation is relevant but is not necessarily the only factor. The physical state of the premises, their facilities and the actual, attempted or intended use all form part of the picture.
Planning Geek already holds the Supreme Court judgment in Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and another v Welwyn Hatfield Borough Council [2011] UKSC 15 in our own library.
Why the Class L argument failed
Class L permits a change between Class C3 dwellinghouse use and Class C4 small HMO use, subject to its limitations.
One of those limitations prevents development where it would result in use as two separate C4 dwellinghouses of a building which was previously used as a single dwellinghouse.
On the evidence, the Inspector found it more likely than not that the property had moved from one dwellinghouse directly to two HMOs. She was not persuaded that the 2024 permission had been physically implemented as two flats or that a lawful two-flat use had been established.
Without the intermediate C3 flats, the appellant’s Class L route had no factual foundation.
The meaning of “previously used” remains unresolved
There was a wider legal argument about the words “previously used” in Class L.
Ealing argued that the restriction catches a building if it had been used as a single dwellinghouse at any earlier point. The appellant argued that the relevant use is the immediately preceding use, so that a genuine intervening use as two flats could take the building outside the limitation.
The Inspector expressly said it was unnecessary to decide that dispute. Because she had found that the last established use was still the single dwellinghouse, the development failed whichever interpretation was correct.
This appeal should therefore not be cited as finally resolving the wider meaning of “previously used” in Class L. It resolves the factual case at Ashness Gardens, not that outstanding point of interpretation.
Planning permission for the HMOs was also refused
The appellant also argued under ground (a) that planning permission should be granted for the two HMOs. That part of the appeal failed on separate planning merits.
The Inspector found the use over-intensive for the property and harmful to the character of the street. The internal accommodation was cramped, some rooms had poor privacy, daylight or outlook, ventilation concerns had not been resolved and most residents had no access to private rear amenity space.
There were also concerns about noise and disturbance to neighbours and increased pressure on on-street parking in an area with poor public transport accessibility.
Those findings do not determine the Class L issue, but they explain why the appellant could not simply obtain retrospective permission as an alternative route.
An Article 4 Direction also limited the future fallback
The evidence showed that an Article 4 Direction now prevents the relevant future C3 to C4 change in the area. The Inspector therefore gave no weight to a suggested fallback based on carrying out the same two-HMO route again.
That is separate from the question of whether the unauthorised development had already benefited from Class L. The Inspector had already found that it did not.
Planning Geek maintains a national HMO Article 4 map for checking where the C3 to C4 right has been withdrawn.
The notice could require removal of physical works that facilitated the use
The ground (f) appeal raised another useful enforcement point. The notice required extensive physical works to be removed or altered as part of restoring lawful control.
The parties referred to Murfitt v Secretary of State for the Environment and East Cambridgeshire DC (1980) 40 P&CR 254, Kestrel Hydro v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2016] EWCA Civ 784 and Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities v Caldwell [2024] EWCA Civ 467. The Inspector summarised the established principle as allowing an enforcement notice to require removal of works that are integral to, and solely for, facilitating an unauthorised use, while drawing a distinction where operational development is itself fundamental to or causative of the change.
Here, the extensions did not themselves constitute the material change of use. They provided additional accommodation used as part of the HMOs and, on the Inspector’s findings, facilitated that unauthorised use.
The Inspector had also rejected the proposition that the extensions were simply part of a genuinely implemented two-flat scheme. In those circumstances, she found that their removal could lawfully be required as part of remedying the breach.
The decision needs to be read in its own factual context. It should not be reduced to a rule that every building operation associated with an unauthorised use can automatically be demolished through a change-of-use enforcement notice.
The extant two-flat permission remained a realistic alternative
The 2024 permission for two flats remained extant and appeared capable of implementation. The enforcement notice itself provided an alternative compliance route under which the property could be altered to accord with that permission rather than simply requiring wholesale demolition.
The Inspector treated that as a realistic fallback. It was materially different from retaining the unauthorised two-HMO arrangement and did not create the same planning harms.
Planning Geek’s guide to dividing or splitting a house explains why planning units, physical works and the actual use of the resulting accommodation need to be considered together.
The practical Class L evidence lesson
Where a permitted development argument depends on an intermediate use, the evidence needs to prove more than an intention or a paper entitlement to occupy.
- Keep dated photographs showing the completed intermediate layout before later works begin
- Retain council tax, utility and banking evidence that matches the claimed occupation
- Use tenancy evidence alongside proof that the tenants actually occupied the accommodation
- Make sure construction and party-wall drawings do not contradict the claimed sequence of development
- Record when kitchens, bathrooms, entrances and other facilities were installed or removed
- Explain the chronology consistently in statutory declarations, applications and building-control records
The balance of probabilities is not a relaxed standard simply because it is civil rather than criminal. The evidence is looked at as a whole, and documents that point in different directions can significantly weaken an otherwise plausible chronology.
For anyone relying on Class L, our Class L guide should be the starting point, alongside the Class C4 HMO guide and our material on lawful development certificates.
Read the Greenford enforcement appeal
The appeal is APP/A5270/C/25/3365332. Planning Geek hosts the full Greenford enforcement appeal decision in our own library. The Planning Inspectorate case page remains the official case record.
Created: 5th September 2026
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